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The Conundrum of Voluntary
Intoxication and Sex
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael†
INTRODUCTION
On June 1, 2014, R.Z.M., a seventeen-year-old male, and
a sixteen-year-old female classmate had been drinking alcohol
and smoking marijuana with a group of friends in a Tulsa,
Oklahoma park.1 According to eyewitnesses, when the girl
became heavily intoxicated and could not walk, R.Z.M.
volunteered to give her a ride home, and two friends carried her
to his car.2 A boy who briefly rode in that car told police
investigators that the girl had been coming in and out of
consciousness.3 After the other boy had left the car, R.Z.M. had
oral sex with the girl and afterward dropped her off at her
grandmother’s house. While still unconscious, she was taken to
a hospital where her blood test showed a blood alcohol content
above .34,4 about four times higher than the legal limit for
driving.5 The victim told police investigators that she did not

† Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee School of Law. I
am grateful to Katharine Baker, Bennett Capers, Nora Demleitner, Joan Shaughnessy,
and Deborah Tuerkheimer for their invaluable and thoughtful comments and feedback
on earlier drafts and to Timothy MacDonnell for helping me think through many of the
issues raised in this article. Finally, I thank the Brooklyn Law Review editors, and
especially Jessica Schneider, Zack Goldberg, and Valentina Lumaj, for their thorough
and thoughtful edits.
1 See State v. R.Z.M., No. JS 2015-1076 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.ocdw.com/main/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/State-v.-RZM.pdf [https://perma.
cc/P7EV-YANY]; see also Clifton Adcock, With Court Ruling, Sodomy Law Doesn’t Apply
When Victim Is Unconscious, OKLA. WATCH (Apr. 23, 2016), http://oklahomawatch.org/201
6/04/23/appeals-court-sodomy-law-doesnt-apply-to-cases-with-unconscious-victims/ [https://
perma.cc/HTX2-F4FC] (initial report on the court’s decision); Molly Redden, Oklahoma
Court: Oral Sex Is Not Rape if Victim Is Unconscious from Drinking, GUARDIAN (Apr. 27,
2016), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/apr/27/oral-sex-rape-ruling-tulsa-oklaho
ma-alcohol-consent [https://perma.cc/EK43-RZDP] (reporting that an Oklahoma court
dismissed forcible oral sodomy charges against a defendant who imposed oral sex on an
unconscious victim).
2 See Redden, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Adcock, supra note 1.
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“have any memories after leaving the park.”6 After a sexual
assault examination found R.Z.M.’s DNA on the victim’s body,
he told investigators that she “had consented to performing
oral sex” on him.7 The prosecution charged R.Z.M. with forcible
oral sodomy under Oklahoma law, yet the trial court granted
his pretrial motion to dismiss the charge.8 Following the state’s
appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the
lower court’s decision, holding that forcible sodomy could not
occur where a victim was so intoxicated as to be completely
unconscious at the time of the oral sexual act because, while the
legislature included intoxication as one of the circumstances for
the crime of rape, it was not mentioned among the five alternate
requirements delineated in the statute for commission of forcible
oral sodomy.9 The decision exemplifies an intolerable outcome:
Engaging in oral sex with a person whose intoxication rendered
him or her unconscious is not a crime under Oklahoma law.
The facts underlying this case are fairly typical for many
males and females who were sexually assaulted after consuming
an excessive amount of alcohol, drugs, or both (hereinafter,
intoxicants).10 Research shows that a large percentage of sexual
assaults involving people who know each other, often called
“acquaintance rape,” occurred while victims were heavily
intoxicated.11 This problem has recently gained significant public
and media attention, mostly in the context of sexual assaults at
higher education institutions.12 Its scope, however, is much

Redden, supra note 1.
Id.
8 Id.; see OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 21, § 888 (West 2017) (prohibiting, among other acts,
“[s]odomy committed upon a person incapable through mental illness or any unsoundness of
mind of giving legal consent regardless of the age of the person committing the crime”).
9 State v. R.Z.M., No. JS 2015-1076 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 24, 2016) (holding
that the prohibition against “sodomy committed [against] a person incapable through
mental illness or any unsoundness of mind of giving legal consent” does not include
incapacity because of intoxication).
10 In this article, I use the terms “intoxicants” and “alcohol” interchangeably.
While alcohol is the most commonly used intoxicant, the scope of the arguments here
extends to impairment due to other intoxicants. Moreover, the article’s arguments
equally apply to female and male victims; sexual assault of intoxicated individuals is
also committed against male and transgender individuals, despite the low level of
reporting these crimes. See generally Bennet Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
1259 (2011) (discussing male rape in various settings and the criminal justice system’s
inappropriate response).
11 See generally CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA)
STUDY 5-4 Exhibit 5-3 (2007) [hereinafter CSA STUDY] (suggesting that about seventy-seven
percent of college sexual assaults occurred when the victim was incapacitated).
12 See generally Jessie Ford & Paula England, What Percent of College Women
Are Sexually Assaulted in College?, CONTEXTS (Jan. 12, 2015), https://contexts.org/blog/
what-percent-of-college-women-are-sexually-assaulted-in-college/ [https://perma.cc/988UNAHZ] (noting that eleven percent of students in their fourth year of college reported that
6

7
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broader than college sexual assaults and also includes assaults
committed in additional settings, such as the military, the
workplace, bars, clubs, streets, and house parties.13
Yet, many sexual assaults do not result in criminal
convictions, either because charges are not brought or because
courts dismiss the charges or acquit the defendants.14 Criminal
codes in most jurisdictions do contain separate provisions
specifically prohibiting sexual intercourse committed against
intoxicated victims.15 But these statutes typically cover cases in
which intoxication was involuntary, namely, when a perpetrator
administered the intoxicants to an unsuspecting victim.16 Here,
imposing criminal liability is mostly uncontroversial; when sexual
predators surreptitiously dupe victims to accomplish intercourse,
there is little disagreement that criminal charges are warranted,
and this article takes no issue with these prohibitions.
Most jurisdictions, however, do not have separate sexual
assault statutes directly prohibiting intercourse with a
voluntarily intoxicated victim, namely, when the victim’s
impaired state resulted from freely consuming an excessive
amount of intoxicants.17 This article specifically targets the
criminal law’s treatment of cases involving sexual assault of
voluntarily intoxicated victims.18
While existing laws typically do not directly prohibit
sexual assault of voluntarily intoxicated victims, these crimes
can and are being prosecuted under general prohibitions that
criminalize sexual intercourse with a person who is incapable
of consenting to sex due to incapacitation.19 These prohibitions
someone had sexual intercourse with them that they did not want while they “were
drunk, passed out, asleep, drugged or otherwise incapacitated”).
13 See generally Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Breaking the Chain of
Command Culture: A Call for an Independent and Impartial Investigative Body to Curb
Sexual Assaults in the Military, 29 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 341, 347, 371 & nn.237–
239 (2014) (Excessive alcohol use is prevalent in the military setting and often alcohol
use precedes sexual assault. Also, the military justice system often responds by
charging victims of sexual assault with intoxication-related offenses.).
14 See, e.g., State v. Haddock, 664 S.E.2d 339, 346 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing
rape conviction on the theory that the statute was not intended for the protection of victims
who had voluntarily ingested intoxicating substances through their own actions).
15 See infra Section II.B.
16 See infra Section II.B.
17 See CAROL E. TRACEY ET AL., WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT & ÆQUITAS, RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 16 (2013).
18 In this article, I focus solely on issues pertaining to imposing criminal liability
as opposed to civil or administrative liability. For discussion of noncriminal liability, see
generally Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 221 (2015) (suggesting that sometimes sexual misconduct is better suited for
administrative and civil measures rather than criminal prosecution).
19 See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing the general prohibition against sex
with incapacitated individuals, which has been adopted in most jurisdictions).
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do not specifically list intoxication as the reason behind the
victim’s incapacitation, but despite the absence of the
intoxication language, courts use a capacity-based standard to
determine whether the victim’s intoxication rose to a level that
rendered him or her incapable of consenting to sex.20 Simply
put, the key inquiry under this prevalent test, which this
article refers to as “the incapacity-to-consent standard,” is how
drunk is too drunk to lack the capacity to consent.21
These general incapacitation provisions, however, mostly
cover cases where victims completely lose consciousness as
opposed to cases where victims’ intoxication falls short of total
incapacitation.22 These statutes fail to protect the many victims
who maintained consciousness but whose ability to communicate
nonconsent was significantly impaired. Imposing criminal
liability in these cases raises vexing questions given several
distinct features characterizing drunken sexual encounters.
First, intoxicants play a significant role not only in unwanted
sexual acts but also in situations involving mutually desired sex,
as individuals often consume intoxicants as a mood enhancer,
deliberately using it as a welcome means to reduce social and
sexual inhibitions.23 Second, the notion of consent, in itself a
notoriously complex standard even where both participants are
sober, becomes especially ambiguous in cases where alcohol
plays a critical part in the equation. Finally, since in many
(though not all) of the cases involving drunken sex both victims
and perpetrators are intoxicated, questions arise concerning the
equitable allocation of risk between the parties engaging in
these encounters. Changing the law in this area therefore
requires reconciling between the criminal law’s need to protect
intoxicated victims, regardless of how their intoxication came
about, on the one hand, and affording equitable resolution to
both parties involved on the other.
At the heart of the conundrum underlying intoxicated
sexual encounters lies the question of how to distinguish
intoxicated yet consensual sex—perfectly lawful, even if often
regrettable after the fact—from a sex crime. This article aims to
answer this question, which has received only scant scholarly

20 See generally Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and
Proposals for Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 134–35 (2002) (discussing the use of the
incapacity-to-consent standard under existing statutes).
21 See infra Section II.A (discussing standards for finding whether sexual
intercourse was consensual).
22 See infra Section II.B.1.
23 See infra Section I.A.
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attention, by making two key arguments.24 First, this article
argues that the incapacity-to-consent standard may prove unfit to
address the myriad variables and nuanced complexities involved
in the sexual assaults of intoxicated victims. Specifically, this
standard sometimes proves underinclusive, failing to protect
victims whose level of intoxication falls short of what the specific
jurisdiction deems incapacitating intoxication. Other times it
proves overinclusive, risking unfairness to defendants. Second, it
contends that the law should directly prohibit nonconsensual
sexual acts with severely intoxicated individuals regardless of
whether their intoxication was self-inflicted or caused by another.
Given insurmountable deficiencies in existing laws, this
article advocates their amendment to better capture defendants’
culpability by identifying predatory features embedded in
engaging in nonconsensual sex with intoxicated victims. Such
sexually predatory conduct is established when defendants
consciously take advantage of a victim’s temporal impairment by
imposing nonconsensual sex. To be sure, a victim’s vulnerability
is not limited to debilitating intoxication, and also includes other
forms of physical and mental impairments, including sleep and
fear. This article, however, focuses solely on vulnerability
stemming from intoxication by directly prohibiting recklessly
engaging in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with victims
whose ability to communicate nonconsent is significantly
impaired due to intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary.
The article proceeds as follows: Part I unfolds the
sociological and psychological backdrop concerning the nuanced
interplay between sex and alcohol given the reality that the
latter plays a critical role both in nonconsensual sexual acts as
well as in mutually desired ones. It illustrates how prevalent
societal perceptions about voluntarily intoxicated individuals
effectively shape prosecutors’, juries’, and judges’ views of sexual
assault of intoxicated victims. Part II provides an overview of
existing statutes used to prosecute sexual assault of intoxicated
victims. It demonstrates that direct prohibitions on intercourse
with intoxicated victims cover only cases involving involuntary
intoxication, failing to protect victims of voluntary intoxication.
Part III explains why general prohibitions on intercourse with
incapacitated individuals are ill-suited to prosecute sexual
assault of intoxicated victims. It shows that the incapacity-toconsent standard may result in inequitable resolutions to both
defendants and victims. Part IV critiques the American Law
24 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1 (2015);
Falk, supra note 20; TRACEY ET AL., supra note 17.

1036

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:3

Institute’s proposals for revision of the Model Penal Code’s
sexual assault of intoxicated victims provision. It contends that
the proposals fail to offer a complete solution to the problems
characterizing sexual assault of intoxicated victims. Part V
first revisits the justifications for amending laws to include
direct prohibitions against nonconsensual intercourse with
voluntarily intoxicated victims. It then proposes a statute that
captures a defendant’s culpable conduct by prohibiting sexual
assault of both voluntarily and involuntarily intoxicated
victims. Briefly put, the proposal advocates the adoption of a
separate provision that would criminalize recklessly engaging
in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a passive and
unresponsive person whose ability to communicate nonconsent
was significantly impaired due to intoxication.
I.

SOCIETAL PERCEPTIONS ABOUT SEX AND INTOXICATION

Before examining the legal terrain surrounding sexual
assault of intoxicated victims, it is essential to set the stage by
considering some sociological and psychological aspects as well
as societal perceptions concerning the relationship between sex
and intoxication. These are closely related to a broader theme
concerning American society’s love-hate relationship with
alcohol, namely, wide acceptance of alcohol’s pervasive role in
various social settings while acknowledging its potentially
harmful effects.
Extensive research shows that a significant number of
sexual assault victims were heavily intoxicated at the time of
the crime.25 Yet, the interplay between sex and alcohol is more
complex than this simple observation because alcohol plays a
critical role not only in nonconsensual sexual encounters but
also in those that are mutually desired. In the following
sections, this article delves into one source of confusion
underlying the legal treatment of sexual assault of intoxicated
victims by examining alcohol’s dual role and the common
societal perceptions surrounding its voluntary consumption.
A.

Alcohol Consumption as Pleasurable Activity

Alcohol is the most commonly used psychoactive substance
and its prevalence as an integral part of people’s lives cannot be

25 See Falk, supra note 20, at 142 (noting that a substantial number of rapes
involve intoxicated victims).
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overstated.26 A significant number of individuals deliberately seek
to get “high,” with the goal of enjoying the pleasurable effects of
intoxication.27 Moreover, alcohol is commonly perceived not
only as an enjoyable social activity but also as paramount in
facilitating social interactions due to its ability in lowering
social inhibitions.28
Scientific research shows that moderate and responsible
alcohol consumption by adults has a favorable impact on their
overall physical and emotional well-being and that drinkers, as
a group, share a number of psychological, social, and cognitive
benefits over abstainers.29 Specifically, studies demonstrate that
alcohol consumption has scientifically proven positive moodaltering effects.30 Scholars note that alcohol consumption also
promotes mutually desired and welcome sexual encounters and
that intoxicated sexual acts may be perfectly consensual.31
Studies that examined whether alcohol consumption was related
to consensual sexual activity that occurred before the sexual
assault found that a significant majority of individuals had
engaged in at least one form of consensual sexual contact prior
to the assault.32 These studies also found that people who were
intoxicated were more likely to have engaged in consensual sex
than sober individuals.33
Alcohol is widely consumed in a myriad of social settings,
including colleges, high schools, the military, bars, and house
26 See Nora V. Demleitner, Organized Crime and Prohibition: What Difference
Does Legalization Make?, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 613, 622–24 (1994) (noting that historical
accounts concerning the failure of Prohibition demonstrate that the majority of
Americans want to consume alcohol and criminally prohibiting its sale has not only failed
to reduce peoples’ social and private consumption, but also resulted in a significant
increase in the drinking habits of women).
27 See Emmanuel Kuntsche et al., Why Do Young People Drink? A Review of
Drinking Motives, 25 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 841 (2005), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.
org/5f16/e057c9d7f841b6b297b84ff9712709f454b3.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZHX-LC2Z] (noting
that many alcohol drinkers are motivated by social motives including enhancing positive
mood or wellbeing and obtaining social rewards).
28 Id.
29 See Archie Brodsky & Stanton Peele, Psychological Benefits of Moderate
Alcohol Consumption: Alcohol’s Role in a Broader Conception of Health and Well-Being,
in ALCOHOL AND PLEASURE: A HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 187–207 (S. Peele & M. Grant eds.,
1999) (noting that epidemiological research has found consistent associations between
moderate alcohol consumption and beneficial psychosocial outcomes).
30 Id.
31 See Elaine Craig, Capacity to Consent to Sexual Risk, 17 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 103, 111 (2014) (discussing intoxicated yet mutually desired sexual encounters).
32 See Nicole Turillon Harrington & Harold Leitenberg, Relationship Between
Alcohol Consumption and Victim Behaviors Immediately Preceding Sexual Aggression
by an Acquaintance, 9 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 315, 315–23 (1994) (noting that seventyfour percent of women had engaged in consensual sexual conduct, such as kissing,
petting, or another form of sexual contact prior to the sexual attack, see id. 319 tbl.2).
33 Id. at 320.
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parties.34 Binge drinking, namely, excessive consumption of
alcohol, has become a pervasive part of today’s social practices
and norms.35 Moreover, heavy alcohol consumption is inextricably
intertwined with the prevalent social practice commonly known
as the “hookup” culture, that is, engaging in casual, uncommitted
sex without the intimacy, romance, or emotional relationship.36
Studies have found a close connection between “hooking up” and
alcohol consumption; for example, one study reported that sixtyfour percent of uncommitted sexual encounters follow alcohol use,
with a median consumption of three alcoholic drinks.37
The high correlation between hookups and excessive
alcohol consumption raises serious concerns given the significant
increase in the commission of nonconsensual sexual acts that
often result from these intoxicated encounters.38 The mere fact
that alcohol was heavily consumed prior to a sexual act,
however, does not render it nonconsensual, since intoxicated
individuals do not lose their right to choose to engage in desired
sex.39 Many intoxicated hookups are perfectly consensual, even if
some of them are regrettable after the fact and would not have
occurred but for the intoxication.40
Media reports predominantly portray alcohol’s harmful
effects and its potential contribution to the commission of sexual
assaults.41 These negative depictions, however, divert society’s
attention from fully grappling with the reality that for many
34 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, DRINKING IN AMERICA: MYTHS, REALITIES, AND PREVENTION POLICY fig.4
(1999) (noting that eight percent of youths aged fifteen to seventeen and twenty-three
percent of youths aged eighteen to twenty reported drinking at least five drinks at one time).
35 See Judith G. McMullen, Underage Drinking: Does Current Policy Make
Sense?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 333, 348–49 (2006) (discussing underage drinking in
college and noting that binge drinking is typically defined as five or more drinks per
occasion).
36 See Justin R. Garcia et al., Sexual Hookup Culture: A Review, 16 REV. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 161, 163 (2012) (explaining that sexual hookup culture refers to sex without
intimacy or relationship).
37 See Melissa A. Lewis et al., Predictors of Hooking Up Sexual Behaviors and
Emotional Reactions Among U.S. College Students, 41 ARCHIVES SEX BEHAV. 1219 (2012)
(noting that a study found that nearly sixty-one percent of undergraduate students used
alcohol, with an average of 3.3 alcoholic drinks, during their most recent hookup).
38 See infra Section II.B.
39 See Craig, supra note 31, at 111.
40 See Garcia et al., supra note 36, at 170–71 (discussing “hookup regret” by
noting that both men and women had experienced some sexual regret, but the frequency
and intensity of negative reactions appeared to vary by sex, with women more negatively
impacted from some hookup experiences, mainly due to stronger feelings of regret
because they felt used); see also Lewis et al., supra note 37 (noting that men reported
lower negative effects resulting from their hookups than women).
41 See, e.g., Emily Yoffe, College Women: Stop Getting Drunk, SLATE (Oct. 15,
2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/10/sexual_assault_and_drink
ing_teach_women_the_connection.html [https://perma.cc/WK3G-V5H3].
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individuals alcohol consumption is anything but a singledimensional, mostly negative experience.42 Notwithstanding the
myriad problems stemming from excessive drinking, alcohol is
here to stay as a popular social activity for a significant number of
people who drink to achieve its pleasurable, mood-altering effects.
B.

Alcohol Consumption as Harmful Activity

While the emerging picture concerning the relationship
between alcohol and sex is not all bleak, it is certainly neither
rosy.43 Alcohol consumption carries a host of adverse effects that
often result in significant harm, both to consumers and to
others.44 The key feature that distinguishes alcohol consumption
from being a pleasurable social activity to one that carries
negative effects lies within the notion of excess. While moderate
drinking is often a positive experience, it is binge drinking—
frequently to oblivion—that leads to ample harms, including
accidents, addiction, health problems, and failure to perform
professional, academic, or personal obligations.45
One of the harms of excessive drinking concerns the
heightened risk of sexual violation. Studies have established a
correlation between intoxication and sexual assault, noting
that a significant number of assaults occur after both victims
and perpetrators consume a substantial amount of alcohol.46
For example, studies have found that becoming intoxicated is a
risk factor that significantly increases people’s chances for
subsequent sexual victimization because their vulnerability
makes them easy prey for sexual predators.47 While victims of
42 See
generally PEGGY ORENSTEIN, GIRLS & SEX: NAVIGATING THE
COMPLICATED NEW LANDSCAPE 185–87 (2016) (discussing the complex role that alcohol
consumption plays among teenagers and young adults).
43 See generally Alcoholism In-Depth Report, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.
nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/alcoholism/print.html [https://perma.cc/9RMC-QWC2]
(describing the host of problems related to excessive alcohol consumption including its
contribution to the incidence of crimes such as murder and domestic violence).
44 See Antonia Abbey et al., Alcohol and Dating Risk Factors for Sexual Assault
Among College Women, 20 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 147, 149–50 (1996).
45 See Anne F. Brennan et al., Alcohol Use and Abuse in College Students I.: A
Review of Individual and Personality Correlates, 21 INT’L J. ADDITIONS 449, 467–68 (1986)
(noting that studies identified two general types of drinking motives: drinking for emotional
escape or coping purposes and drinking for social purposes); see also Anne F. Brennan et al.,
Alcohol Use and Abuse in College Students II.: Social/Environmental Correlates,
Methodological Issues, and Implications for Intervention, 21 INT’L J. ADDICTIONS 475 (1986).
46 See Maria Testa et al., The Role of Victim and Perpetrator Intoxication on
Sexual Assault Outcomes, 65 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 320 (2004) (suggesting that
“[a]pproximately half of all sexual assault incidents among college and young adult
populations involve the use of alcohol or drugs by the perpetrator, the victim or both”).
47 See BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEXUAL
VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 23 (2000); Meichun Muhler-Kuo et al., Correlates
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sexual assault include not only women but also men and
transgender people, women are disproportionally victimized;
they are more adversely affected than men by excessive
drinking because of physiological differences.48 Scientific studies
confirm that women and men process alcohol differently, namely,
that men are able to handle excessive alcohol consumption in a
way that is less detrimental to their cognitive functioning and
that women become intoxicated faster.49
Some studies have gone beyond observing the correlation
between excessive alcohol consumption and sexual assault,
suggesting that there is a causal link between them.50 These
studies, however, are controversial, mainly because mere
correlation between two phenomena does not prove actual
causation.51 While many studies find, as an empirical matter,
that alcohol was consumed prior to the sexual assault, such
observation does not establish a causal link between the two and
there is no evidence that alcohol, in fact, causes sexual assault.52
The precise role of alcohol in facilitating sexual assault
remains highly contested.53 Scholars reject the argument that
excessive drinking causes rape, stressing that sexual predators
commit rape, using intoxication as an excuse for sexual
aggression.54 Studies further demonstrate that sexual assaults
are also closely linked with actors’ certain personality
characteristics, such as impulsivity and low empathy, and their
past experiences such as sexual abuse.55 These attitudinal and
situational factors interact with alcohol consumption, increasing
the likelihood of sexual assaults.56
Conceding that there is no direct causal connection
between alcohol consumption and sexual assault, however, does
of Rape While Intoxicated in a National Sample of College Women, 65 J. STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 37, 40, tbl.2 (2004).
48 See Are Women More Vulnerable to Alcohol’s Effects?, ALCOHOL ALERT, Dec.
1999, https://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/aa46.htm [https://perma.cc/JYT9-8BXS].
49 See id. (noting that in light of physiological differences between women’s
and men’s bodies, women absorb and metabolize alcohol faster, when compared to men
who consume similar amounts).
50 See Leanne R. Brecklin & Sarah E. Ullman, The Roles of Victim and
Offender Substance Use in Sexual Assault Outcomes, 25 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
1503, 1509 (2010).
51 See Antonia Abbey, Alcohol Related Sexual Assault: A Common Problem
Among College Students, 14 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 118, 119 (2002) (noting that the “fact
that alcohol consumption and sexual assault frequently co-occur does not demonstrate”
a causal connection between them).
52 See id.
53 See CSA STUDY, supra note 11, at 1–2.
54 See Abbey, supra note 51, at 119–20.
55 Id. at 120.
56 Id. (noting that perpetrators often use alcohol to excuse sexual assault
perpetration).
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not mean that the two are not closely related; studies show that
the fact that the perpetrator, the victim, or both, were heavily
intoxicated significantly contributed to the occurrence of sexual
assaults and increased its chances.57 The explanation behind
this increased likelihood is twofold: from the victim’s perspective,
intoxication affects her ability to successfully resist a
perpetrator’s predatory conduct given the profound effects that
alcohol consumption has on a drinker’s functions and perceptions.
From the perpetrator’s perspective, studies show that excessive
alcohol consumption increases a perpetrator’s willingness to
behave aggressively.58
The physical and mental effects of excessive consumption
of intoxicants are well documented in the scientific literature,
encompassing both cognitive and motor skills abilities.59 The
level of impairment in motor skills varies, ranging from
inability to stand, loss of balance and muscular coordination,
inability to perform simple physical tasks,60 and culminating in
passing out. Decrease in cognitive functions includes the
inability to understand, know, think, respond, communicate
coherently, exercise judgment, accurately perceive threats, and
remember experiences.61
Excessive consumption of alcohol impairs victims’ ability
to react to perceived risks because the perception of reality is
substantially distorted and judgment is clouded.62 Impaired
ability to respond to dangerous situations renders intoxicated
individuals especially vulnerable to sexual assault. Alcohol’s
effects on motor skills also render victims incapable of effectively
resisting nonconsensual sexual acts that they could have fended
off had they been sober.63 Individuals who are incapable of
57 See Ford & England, supra note 12 (noting that eleven percent of more than
20,000 students surveyed reported being subjected to unwanted sex while they were
drunk, passed out, asleep, drugged, or otherwise incapacitated).
58 See Abbey, supra note 51, at 122.
59 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE &
ALCOHOLISM, ALCOHOL’S DAMAGING EFFECTS ON THE BRAIN 1 (2004), https://pubs.niaaa.
nih.gov/publications/aa63/aa63.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU7U-5EMB].
60 See Ty Brumback et al., Effects of Alcohol on Psychomotor Performance and
Perceived Impairment in Heavy Binge Social Drinkers, 91 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 10 (2007).
61 See id. at 10–11.
62 See Maria Testa & Jennifer A. Livingston, Qualitative Analysis of Women’s
Experiences of Sexual Aggression: Focus on the Role of Alcohol, 23 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q.
573, 573–89 (1999) (suggesting that victims who were sexually assaulted while they were
intoxicated reported that their intoxication made them take risks that they normally
would avoid).
63 See Antonia Abbey et al., Alcohol, Misperception, and Sexual Assault: How
and Why Are They Linked?, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES 138–56 (David M. Buss. & Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996).
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guarding themselves against perceived risks become easy prey
to sexual predators.
C.

Societal Misperceptions About Voluntary Intoxication

The ambiguity stemming from the dual role that
intoxicants play in facilitating both desired and nonconsensual
sex is further exacerbated by the prevalence of misperceptions,
myths, and stereotypes about the relationship between sex and
voluntary intoxication. The fact that a person’s intoxication
resulted from an autonomous choice to over imbibe proves vital to
the way society perceives which sexual encounters are consensual
and which are not. In the public’s eye, the voluntariness of the
intoxication is a key factor that distinguishes welcome sexual
encounters from sexual assaults.
A common perception concerning the alleged effects of
intoxication on a person’s willingness to have sex is the belief
that alcohol increases sexual arousal and loosens sexual
inhibitions.64 Related to that is the perception that people
deliberately consume alcohol to achieve that effect—purposely
getting intoxicated to have sex.65 Research also suggests that
alcohol consumption “encourages biased appraisal of a partner’s
sexual motives” and “enhances misperception of sexual intent.”66
Moreover, studies found that alcohol not only has actual
disinhibiting effects but also contributes to people’s social
expectations about these effects, including their tendency to be
sexually aggressive.67 Many individuals feel more aggressive after
drinking alcohol, and these expectations not only become selffulfilling but also increase the amount of alcohol they drink.68
These perceptions are critical to an actor’s beliefs
regarding whether consent had been given in an intoxicated
sexual encounter. One of the pitfalls of the perceived desired
effect of voluntary intoxication is the pervasive societal
misperception that when people voluntarily binge drink, they

See Abbey, supra note 51, at 121.
Id. (noting that the mere presence of alcohol leads many men to assume
the women wanted sex).
66 Id. at 120, fig.1.
67 Id. at 121 (noting that the expectations concerning alcohol’s effects are
independent of alcohol’s actual pharmacological effects).
68 See generally Mark Snyder & Arthur A. Stukas, Jr., Interpersonal
Processes: The Interplay of Cognitive, Motivational, and Behavioral Activities in Social
Interaction, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 273, 274–75 (1999) (noting that individuals’ social
interactions are sometimes impacted by expectations they perceive through those
interactions, often resulting in a “self-fulfilling prophecy”).
64

65
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make themselves sexually available.69 For example, studies show
that women who drink alcohol are perceived as being more
sexually promiscuous than women who do not, making them
easy targets for sexual assault.70 Studies further show that a
predatory dynamic is often at work in cases involving intoxicated
perpetrators as well as intoxicated victims. Both experience the
cognitive deficits of the intoxicants, leading perpetrators to feel
that being sexually aggressive is acceptable if they believed their
partners encouraged their sexual interest and that once led on,
they are entitled to sex.71 These myths prove especially dangerous
to intoxicated victims because they imply that voluntary
intoxication equals consent to any and all sexual acts, effectively
placing them in a state of perpetual willingness to have sex.
These myths and misconceptions not only result in
significant perils for voluntarily intoxicated individuals but
also hinder the chances of successful prosecutions.72 The reason
for this impediment is that societal misperceptions in turn
effectively shape prosecutors’ assessments of whether consent
to sex had been given, and therefore influence their decisions
whether to pursue criminal charges.
Bringing criminal charges against defendants who
sexually assaulted intoxicated victims is impeded by the
tremendous amount of discretion given to law enforcement
officers and prosecutors in deciding which sexual acts amount to
criminal conduct.73 Scholars have long-observed that prosecutorial
discretion, rather than legislatively defined statutes, plays a
critical role in determining the scope, shape, and form of the
criminal justice system.74 Scholars are especially concerned with
prosecutors’ broad discretion to choose which cases warrant
prosecution because their discretion is unconfined, unstructured,

69 See William H. George & Jeanette Norris, Alcohol, Disinhibition, Sexual
Arousal, and Deviant Sexual Behavior, 15 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD 133, 133–
38 (1991).
70 See William H. George et al., Self-Reported Alcohol Expectancies and
Postdrinking Sexual Inferences About Women, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 164 (1995).
71 See Abbey, supra note 51, at 122.
72 See TERESA P. SCALZO, AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST. & NAT’L DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS ASS’N, PROSECUTING ALCOHOL-FACILITATED SEXUAL ASSAULT 1 (2007), http://
www.ndaa.org/pdf/pub_prosecuting_alcohol_facilitated_sexual_assault.pdf [https://perma.
cc/XPY8-R6VA].
73 See Amy Knight Burns, Improving Prosecution of Sexual Assault Cases:
Can the Justice Department Use 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to Investigate Prosecutors’ Offices?,
67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 22–24 (2014).
74 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 506, 519 (2001) (noting that criminal law is defined by law enforcers, by
prosecutors’ decisions to prosecute, and police decisions to arrest and that the definition of
crimes “empower prosecutors, who are the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers”).
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and unchecked.75 One implication of exercising such unregulated
prosecutorial discretion concerns the role that extralegal
considerations play in prosecutorial policy-based choices about
which cases should be prosecuted.76 The reason behind a
prosecutor’s decision not to pursue criminal charges in sexual
assault cases involving a victim’s voluntary intoxication lies
not only with the scope of statutory provisions but also with the
pervasive effect of societal misperceptions. These shape police
officers’ and prosecutors’ discretion in a way that often results in a
decision to dismiss the complaint as “unfounded” or
“unsubstantiated.”77 In the eyes of many law enforcement officers
and prosecutors, sexual assault of a voluntarily intoxicated victim
is simply not perceived as “real rape.”
Importantly, the criminal justice system is characterized
by a deeply embedded perceived dichotomy between a culpable
perpetrator and an innocent victim, free of contributory fault or
moral blame.78 Traditionally, prosecutors have been reluctant to
prosecute cases where victims’ purportedly unchaste behaviors
fail to comport with traditional perceptions about blameless
victims falling prey to predators.79 While archaic notions about
victims’ chastity have been officially eliminated from legal
considerations, they continuously persist in decision-makers’
perceptions about victimhood.80 The criminal justice system is
often skeptical of victims who are perceived as less than perfect
according to prevailing societal norms.81 Rape law reformers
have criticized the practice of taking these considerations into

75 See Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 785, 792 (2012) (discussing the unlimited nature of prosecutorial discretion).
76 See generally David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence
in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 580–81 (1994) (positing that “[e]xtralegal
considerations influence police, prosecutors, and especially jurors to allow some
acquaintance rapists to go without punishment”).
77 See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics:
America’s Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197, 1221–22 (2014) (discussing police
officers use of the designation “unfounded” to label rape complaints).
78 See generally COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE: FEMINIST AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 78–82 (1995).
79 See generally Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. & PHIL.
127, 132 (1992) (noting that law and culture reciprocally influence understanding of
what is and is not the crime of rape).
80 See Michelle J. Anderson, Diminishing the Legal Impact of Negative Social
Attitudes Toward Acquaintance Rape Victims, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 644, 657–61 (2010)
(discussing negative social attitudes toward rape victims perceived as “unchaste”).
81 See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape
Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 389, 469 (1996) (discussing
cultural rape narratives in criminal prosecutions).
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account, endeavoring to decrease the criminal justice system’s
tendency to judge and assign blame to rape victims.82
This problem is further exacerbated in cases involving
voluntarily intoxicated victims because they typically do not fit
the traditional script about victimhood and criminal
perpetration.83 Decision-makers’ choices concerning which cases
should be criminally prosecuted are shaped by the pervasive
social misperception that by voluntarily impairing themselves,
victims share responsibility for ensuing sexual acts. These
victims are viewed as less worthy of the law’s protection
because, allegedly by choosing to become heavily intoxicated,
they put themselves in harm’s way, willingly assuming the
risks that flow from their free choices.
Societal beliefs about voluntary intoxication and sex
affect not only police officers’ and prosecutors’ decisions but
also judges’ and juries’ perceptions of these cases. Studies show
that jurors often view voluntarily intoxicated victims with deep
skepticism and are less prone to accept their claims that they
did not consent to sex.84 Furthermore, another common
misperception that shapes judges’ and jurors’ views is the
assumption that voluntarily intoxicated victims had engaged in
consensual sexual acts but later regretted them once sober,
mischaracterizing regretful sex as sexual assault.85
Another manifestation of judges’ and juries’
misperceptions regarding voluntarily intoxicated victims is an
implicit normative judgment that assigns moral blame on
people who willingly become intoxicated. Jurors and judges are
often influenced by societal attitudes that blame victims for
their drinking.86 Additionally, the gendered difference between
societal perceptions of intoxicated males and females should be
82 See generally Lisa Gotell, Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian
Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV.
865 (2008) (noting that even after years of law reform, courts still judge rape victims
harshly, implicitly blaming them for risky behaviors).
83 See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt
Complaint
Requirement, Corroboration Requirement and Cautionary Instructions on Campus
Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 1007–10 (2004) (noting that alcohol-induced
campus rapes often do not conform to stereotypical rape accounts).
84 See generally JODY RAPHAEL, RAPE IS RAPE: HOW DENIAL, DISTORTION, AND
VICTIM BLAMING ARE FUELING A HIDDEN ACQUAINTANCE RAPE CRISIS 53–54, 148–54
(2013) (discussing public perceptions that involve blaming victims and expressing
disbelief at victims’ characterizing sexual encounters as rape).
85 See Cathy Young, Feminists Want Us to Define These Ugly Sexual
Encounters as Rape. Don’t Let Them, WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/20/feminists-want-us-to-define-these-uglysexual-encounters-as-rape-dont-let-them/ [https://perma.cc/N7ZN-6PXB].
86 See Christine Chambers Goodman, Protecting the Party Girl: A New
Approach for Evaluating Intoxicated Consent, 2009 BYU L. REV. 57, 88–89 (2009).
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noted; intoxicated females are often deemed more responsible
in having brought the situation upon themselves “because their
drunkenness constitutes a violation of appropriate behavior for
their gender.”87
Societal misperceptions also contribute to victims’
reluctance to file complaints with the police. Rape is the most
underreported crime, with less than twenty percent of
occurrences being reported to law enforcement officers.88 Victims
who were sexually assaulted while intoxicated often fail to
characterize their nonconsensual sexual experience as rape,
instead perceiving it as an unfortunate result of their own
failing.89 For many victims who were sexually attacked while
intoxicated, having been that impaired becomes a source of
guilt and shame.90 Since victims are wary of being judged,
anticipating that the criminal justice system will place at least
partial blame on them, they are hesitant to rely on this system
for recourse. In sum, societal misperceptions affect not only the
public’s image about voluntarily intoxicated victims’ behaviors
but also shape the legal treatment of sex crimes perpetrated
against them. The following parts examine existing criminal
prohibitions of sexual assault of intoxicated victims, focusing
on their main drawbacks.
II.

EXISTING LAWS ON SEXUAL ASSAULT OF INTOXICATED
VICTIMS

Prosecuting the sexual assault of intoxicated victims
raises inherent difficulties, partly due to existing laws’
understanding of the notion of consent to sex and the
circumstances under which sexual acts are deemed
nonconsensual, and partly due to the various array of tests used
in different jurisdictions to determine the victim’s incapacity to
consent to sex.91 The following sections demonstrate the main
problems in existing statutes.
87 Id. at 76, n.69 (quoting Georgina S. Hammock & Deborah R. Richardson,
Blaming Drunk Victims: Is It Just World or Sex Role Violation?, 23 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1574, 1575 (1993)).
88 See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 1–2, 33 (2006) (noting that only twelve
percent of male victims report their sexual assaults).
89 See ORENSTEIN, supra note 42, at 197 (noting that one victim even told her
rapist: “Thanks, I had fun”).
90 See Abbey, supra note 51, at 124 (noting that victims often blame
themselves for becoming incapacitated).
91 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 25–30 (discussing the many problems
characterizing the prosecutions of sexual assault of intoxicated victims).
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Unsuitability of General Sexual Assault Statutes

The crime of rape has historically consisted of two
elements: use of physical force or the threat to use it, and
nonconsensual sex, which was typically proven by showing that
the complainant had physically resisted the act to the utmost.92
While most jurisdictions have abandoned the stringent
physical resistance requirement, the vast majority of statutes
still retain a force requirement of some degree, yet many also
recognize implied forms of force or coercion.93 Given the
relaxation of the force requirement, the nonconsensual nature
of the sexual act is the feature that distinguishes a criminal
sexual encounter from a lawful one, therefore requiring the
adoption of a standard to evaluate the presence or absence of
consent in any given case.94
In recent years, most jurisdictions have adopted the
verbal resistance requirement, commonly known as the “no
means no” standard, to determine when consent to sex is
absent.95 This standard requires proof that the complainant
explicitly expressed his or her refusal to engage in the sexual act
through either words or conduct.96 In contrast, a minority of
jurisdictions adopted the affirmative permission standard, under
which only an explicit verbal “yes” or a behavior implicitly
communicating agreement to the sexual act suffices as consent
to sexual intercourse; absent some indication of consent, the
complainant is deemed not to have consented.97 Jurisdictions that
92 See generally STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 3–4 (1998) (discussing traditional rape law’s
dual requirement of force and nonconsent).
93 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 15 (noting that a majority of
jurisdictions rely on force to define rape); see also John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni,
“No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-consent” Reform Movement in American
Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1120–22 (2011)
(discussing states’ statutes that criminalize various forms of nonphysical threats and
coercion).
94 See generally Katharine K. Baker & Michelle Oberman, Women’s Sexual
Agency and the Law of Rape in the 21st Century, 69 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 63, 64–65
(2016) (noting that the focus of rape laws has shifted in recent years to identifying
what standard ought to be used to assess whether consent has been given).
95 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2)(d) (McKinney 2013) (“[T]he victim
clearly expressed that he or she did not consent to engage in [a sexual] act.”); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 2013) (“[T]he victim did not consent . . . and such
lack of consent was clearly expressed by the victim’s words or conduct.”).
96 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 13 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L.
441, 448 (2016) (noting that in jurisdictions that “require a demonstration of
unwillingness to engage in sexual conduct,” “‘without consent’ means without an
expression of non-consent”).
97 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2013) (defining consent as “words or
overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely
given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
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define consent to require an affirmative gesture of willingness
significantly diverge in their treatments of consent; many
retain a separate force requirement, others include expressed
or implied acquiescence to explain consent’s meaning, yet in
others the affirmative consent standard applies only to forcible
rape charges and does not apply to the lesser crime of sexual
contact.98 Only three jurisdictions criminalize sexual intercourse
without affirmative consent at the felony level and without
requiring any additional elements.99
While the affirmative consent standard transforms the
legal meaning of passivity, under the verbal resistance standard,
by contrast, a complainant’s irresponsiveness is not deemed as
nonconsent.100 Since the passive acquiescence of a victim to
another person’s sexual imposition is equated with consent, a
sexual act with a person who failed to convey explicit verbal
refusal is not criminalized.101 Furthermore, any type of ambiguity
with regard to whether consent had been given is resolved in
favor of the defendant because the burden rests with the
complainant to actively express nonconsent.102
Evaluating whether a given sexual encounter was
consensual is further compounded in cases where a complainant
was significantly impaired due to intoxication. Two major
obstacles preclude the prosecution of sexual assault of intoxicated
3251(3) (West 1977) (defining consent to mean “words or actions by a person indicating
a voluntary agreement to engage in a sexual act”); In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277
(N.J. 1992) (New Jersey courts adopted the affirmative consent standard in judicial
opinions rather than in a statute, holding that consent requires permission to engage
in sexual penetration that must be affirmative and must be given freely.).
98 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 96, at 450–51 (distinguishing between “diluted”
affirmative consent jurisdictions, which supplement the affirmative consent element with
an additional force requirement or include acquiescence within the meaning of consent,
and “pure” affirmative consent jurisdictions, which criminalize as a felony intercourse
without affirmative consent).
99 Id. at 451 (Wisconsin, Vermont, and New Jersey).
100 See id. (noting that affirmative consent definitions transform the legal
meaning of passivity); cf. Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 29 (noting that “utter passivity
on the part of the victim is equated with consent to intercourse”).
101 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 1453, 1497–98 (2014) (explaining that under many statutes, mere submission to
sex or passive acquiescence amounts to consent to sex).
102 See Baker & Oberman, supra note 94, at 71 (observing that the burden of
proof in rape cases causes a significant obstacle because the burden rests with the state
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim expressed nonconsent); see also
Tuerkheimer, supra note 96, at 449, n.34 (noting that “an affirmative consent [standard]
does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant,” but instead “reflects a legal
presumption that, in and of itself, an absence of conduct indicating willingness to engage
in sexual activities does not constitute consent”). The most problematic aspect of the
verbal refusal standard involves cases where alleged victims remained passive and did
not communicate in any way their refusal to the sexual act. Since intoxicated individuals
are both physically and mentally impaired, the result of their passivity is that failure to
communicate nonconsent deems the sexual act consensual.
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victims under general sexual assault prohibitions. First, when a
person is heavily intoxicated, almost no amount of force is needed
to subdue him or her, making it unnecessary for the defendant
to use any force to accomplish intercourse.103 Since most
jurisdictions still require some degree of force to prove rape, the
crime cannot be proven if the defendant did not use any force.
Second, heavily intoxicated victims’ impaired state often renders
them irresponsive, therefore unable to express nonconsent to
intercourse. Applying the verbal refusal standard in these cases
would result in concluding that the sexual act was consensual,
despite the fact that the victim’s substantial impairment due to
intoxication precluded any conscious decision-making process.
Acknowledging that general sexual assault statutes prove inapt
when applied to sexual assaults involving heavily intoxicated
victims, most jurisdictions adopted specific prohibitions to
prosecute these cases. The following section turns to examine
their scopes and limits.
B.

Separate Prohibitions to Protect Impaired Victims

While different jurisdictions vary significantly in their
treatments of sexual intercourse with persons whose impairment
precludes them from expressing consent, prohibitions generally
fall under two categories: prohibitions that directly criminalize
sexual assault of an intoxicated person and prohibitions that
generally criminalize intercourse with a person who is incapable
of expressing consent or resisting the sexual act, no matter what
the reason for such incapacity.104 The main difference between
these categories of statutes is that direct prohibitions on
intercourse with intoxicated persons typically cover cases where
complainants were involuntary intoxicated, while prohibitions
on intercourse with incapacitated persons also cover situations
where complainants were voluntarily intoxicated.
1. Direct Prohibitions on Intercourse with Intoxicated
Persons
Many jurisdictions adopted separate prohibitions directly
criminalizing sexual intercourse with intoxicated persons whose
power to appraise or control their conduct has been substantially

103 Commonwealth v. Blache, 880 N.E.2d 736, 745 (Mass. 2008) (noting that a
finding of complainant’s incapacity to consent due to intoxication satisfies the element of
lack of consent).
104 See TRACEY ET AL., supra note 17, at 27–28.
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impaired.105 These prohibitions focus on identifying the precise
circumstances under which a person is so impaired that he or
she is incapable of consenting to sex. They explicitly use the
intoxication terminology, listing intoxication due to alcohol or
controlled substances. Most jurisdictions criminalize intercourse
with a person who is either physically helpless or mentally
incapacitated, specifically listing intoxication as one reason for
the victim’s incapacity.106 A minority of jurisdictions criminalize
intercourse with an intoxicated person as a separate category,
targeting only intoxication.107
The common law has long prohibited intercourse with
victims whose permanent or temporary physical conditions
including unconsciousness, sleep, or other physical helplessness
precluded them from resisting the sexual act.108 The physical
helplessness standard is too narrow, however, covering only the
most extreme cases of incapacitation; the standard fails to cover
cases where the intoxication fell short of complete loss of
consciousness or where the victim of a sexual assault drifted in
and out of consciousness.109
Acknowledging the restrictive nature of the physical
incapacity test, most jurisdictions have expanded their statutes
to also prohibit intercourse with a mentally incapacitated

105 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402(4)(d) (West 2016); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(5) (West 2016); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 761(j)(5) (West 2016); see
generally David DeMatteo et al., Sexual Assault on College Campuses: A 50-State Survey
of Criminal Sexual Assault Statutes and Their Relevance to Campus Sexual Assault, 21
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 227 (2015) (providing a fifty-state survey of sexual assault
statutes that may apply to sexual assaults committed on college campuses, including,
among others, those pertaining to intercourse with intoxicated victims).
106 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14-1(g), (i) (West 2012).
107 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-a, § 253(2)(A) (West 2016) (prohibiting
an actor from engaging in a sexual act with a person if the “actor has substantially
impaired the other person’s power to appraise or control the other person’s sexual acts
by furnishing, . . . administering or employing drugs, intoxicants or other similar means”);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3) (West 2013) (prohibiting sexual intercourse “[w]here a
person is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any
controlled substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably should have been
known by the accused”).
108 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 380–81 (1870) (holding
“that the crime, which the evidence in this case tends to prove, of a man’s having carnal
intercourse with a woman, without her consent, while she was, as he knew, wholly
insensible so as to be incapable of consenting, and with such force as was necessary to
accomplish the purpose, was rape”).
109 See People v. Johnson, 12 N.E.3d 1109, 1110 (N.Y. 2014) (Defendant was
charged with rape of a voluntarily intoxicated victim based on the theory that the victim
was incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless. The court acquitted the
defendant after the defendant admitted in a plea agreement to raping a mentally
intoxicated person, which is a crime in New York only if the defendant administered the
intoxicants to the victim. Since the victim was not completely unconscious, the prosecution
could not secure a conviction.).
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person.110 These prohibitions often list temporary incapacitation
due to intoxication as one type of mental incapacity.111 For
example, a statute that uses this method typically prohibits
sexual intercourse if “[t]he victim is incapable of consent by
reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep or
any other similar impairment of cognition and such condition is
known or should have reasonably been known to the
defendant.”112 Such a definition is seemingly sufficient to reach
cases in which victims suffered from a lesser degree of
impairment falling short of unconsciousness.
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, however, the scope
of the specific prohibitions targeting the victim’s intoxication is
significantly limited because voluntary and involuntary
intoxication are treated differently.113 Notably, in about forty
jurisdictions, criminal prohibitions of sexual assault of intoxicated
victims cover only cases where the victim was surreptitiously
duped after the actor intentionally administered him or her
intoxicants, including rape-facilitating drugs, in order to
accomplish intercourse.114 But these statutes do not cover cases in
which a victim of sexual assault became voluntarily intoxicated
after consciously consuming an excessive amount of intoxicants.
In fact, only about ten jurisdictions have adopted statutes that
do not limit the scope of sexual assault of an intoxicated victim
to involuntary intoxication.115
The Minnesota case of State v. Blevins provides an
example of statutes under which criminalization depends on
whether the victim’s intoxication was voluntary or involuntary.116
In this case, the victim, T.W., went out with her friends and
voluntarily consumed between ten to twelve alcoholic drinks.117
T.W. testified that she became heavily intoxicated and at some
110 See Falk, supra note 20, at 158–59 (noting that the majority of jurisdictions
specifically state that mental incapacitation includes one that is due to the influence of a
narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance).
111 Id.
112 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1401(7)(b), 13-1406 (West 2015); FLA.
STAT. § 794.011 (West 2017).
113 See, e.g., State v. Haddock, 664 S.E.2d 339, 346 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
114 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 3 (West 2016) (providing for a
separate crime punishable by ten years imprisonment where a person “applies, administers
to or causes to be taken by a person any drug, matter or thing with intent to stupefy or
overpower such person so as to thereby enable any person to have sexual intercourse or
unnatural sexual intercourse with such person”).
115 See TRACEY ET AL., supra note 17, at 24–26 & n.133, 27 (listing Arizona,
California, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, Washington, and
Wisconsin as jurisdictions that specifically include voluntary intoxication within the
coverage of their intoxication prohibitions).
116 State v. Blevins, 757 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
117 Id.
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point was separated from her friends and could not find her
car.118 The defendant approached her and led her to believe
that he was going to help her find the car.119 He then “took T.W.
to the back-porch area of a house in a residential neighborhood
and led her down stairs to a crawl space under the porch,”
where he “first performed oral sex on [her] and then had sexual
intercourse with her.”120 The victim testified about defendant’s
advances, saying that “that’s not what [she] wanted,” and that
she “told him [she] didn’t want him to, and he just kept telling
[her] it would be okay . . . . [She] asked him to please not and he
said it will be fine.”121 She further “testified that because she felt
stuck, uncomfortable, and afraid, she ‘just let it happen’ and
‘waited for it to be over,’” and that she “did not scream or fight
because she was afraid that [the defendant] would harm her in
other ways and because she was in an unfamiliar neighborhood.”122
The defendant was charged with two counts of thirddegree criminal sexual conduct in violation of the Minnesota
statute that prohibits intercourse with a physically helpless
person.123 The Minnesota statute defines “[p]hysically helpless”
as follows:
[A] person is (a) asleep or not conscious, (b) unable to withhold
consent or to withdraw consent because of a physical condition, or (c)
unable to communicate nonconsent and the condition is known or
reasonably should have been known to the actor.124

After the jury convicted him, the defendant appealed,
claiming that the evidence did not prove that the victim was
unable to withhold or to withdraw consent, and thus it was
insufficient to establish the charge of intercourse with a
physically helpless person. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
agreed and reversed the conviction.125 The court concluded that
the victim’s words to the defendant—that she did not consent to
the sexual encounter—proved that she withheld her consent, thus
the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that she was unable
to withhold or withdraw her consent.126 Therefore, the evidence
was insufficient to prove that the victim was “physically helpless”
as defined in the above statute. Importantly, this statute covers
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (first alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 699; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(9) (West 2013).
State v. Blevins, 757 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 701.
Id.
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both voluntary and involuntary intoxication, without
distinguishing them, provided that there is evidence that the
complainant was indeed physically helpless regardless of how
such helplessness came about. Since the victim in this case
maintained consciousness, however, and was able to express her
unwillingness to engage in the sexual act, the result was that
the defendant was acquitted of the crime of raping a physically
helpless person.127
The above acquittal begs the question of whether the
defendant could have been charged based on a different statute,
which criminalizes nonconsensual sex with an intoxicated
complainant without requiring loss of consciousness.128
Specifically, in addition to criminalizing intercourse with
“physically helpless” individuals, Minnesota law separately
criminalizes intercourse with a “mentally incapacitated” person,
defined as “a person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic,
anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to that person
without the person’s agreement, lacks the judgment to give a
reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration.”129
Yet Blevins could not have been charged under this provision
because the statute makes explicit that the scope of the
“mental incapacity” definition is limited to include only cases
where another person administered the intoxicants to the
victim. The statute therefore precludes bringing criminal
charges in cases where victims voluntarily consumed the
intoxicants without the defendant’s administering them.130
Minnesota’s law is illustrative of most jurisdictions’
disparate statutory scheme in which criminalization is
predicated on whether the victim became involuntarily or
voluntarily intoxicated;131 a defendant cannot be convicted of
127 For further discussion of the issue involving an intoxicated victim’s
expression of nonconsent, see infra Section III.B.2.
128 It should be noted that under Minnesota law, a person who engages in
nonconsensual sexual contact with another may be charged under the crime of criminal
sexual contact in the fifth degree. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451 (West 2013) (criminal
sexual conduct in the fifth degree). While this provision equally applies to both sober and
intoxicated complainants, it constitutes only a gross misdemeanor, rather than a felony,
and fails to capture the unique wrongdoing that engaging in nonconsensual sex with an
intoxicated person represents. For a further explanation on why a general prohibition on
sex without consent is unsatisfactory and why a separate prohibition specifically
targeting nonconsensual sex with intoxicated individuals is a preferable solution, see
infra Parts IV, V.
129 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341 subdiv. 7 (2016).
130 Some jurisdictions criminalize physical and mental incapacitation in one
provision, for example, ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(2) (2016) (combining mental and
physical incapacitation in its definition of “incapacitated”), ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(2),
(4), (8)(b) (2016) (providing definitions of “incapacitated”).
131 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (2008) (“For the purpose of
preventing resistance, the offender substantially impairs the other person’s judgment or
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intercourse with a mentally incapacitated individual because
the statute requires that the intoxication be involuntary and
precludes liability if it was voluntary. In addition, a defendant
cannot be convicted of intercourse with a physically helpless
individual if the victim’s intoxication fell short of complete
unconsciousness. Such a statutory scheme fails to cover victims
of voluntary intoxication who are substantially impaired but
presumably too sober to lose consciousness.132 The fact that
victims in these circumstances may remain underprotected
demonstrates the underinclusiveness of this statutory framework.
This outcome appears especially problematic due to the fact that
evidence that the victim did not completely lose her ability to say
“no,” even though evidence clearly showed that her intoxication
rendered her significantly impaired, resulted in the defendant’s
acquittal. Cases like Blevins, therefore, demonstrate existing
laws’ problematic distinction between voluntary and involuntary
intoxication, which may result in victims of voluntary intoxication
remaining underprotected.
2. Prohibitions Against Intercourse with Incapacitated
Persons
In addition to statutes that directly criminalize intercourse
with involuntarily intoxicated people, most jurisdictions have
adopted statutes that prohibit intercourse with people who are
unable to consent due to incapacitation, regardless of its source or
reason.133 In contrast with the statutes discussed above, general
incapacitation provisions do not use the intoxication language as
part of the definition of the offense.134 Instead, these statutes
control by administering any drug, intoxicant, or controlled substance to the other person
surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or deception.”); FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (2017)
(defining “mentally incapacitated” as “temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling a
person’s own conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or intoxicating
substance administered without his or her consent or due to any other act committed
upon that person without his or her consent”).
132 For a similar result, see State v. Haddock, 664 S.E.2d 339, 346 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008) (precluding criminal liability where the victim became voluntarily intoxicated, to a
level short of unconsciousness or physical helplessness as a result of her own actions,
reasoning that the statutory language “due to any act committed upon the victim” does
not allow expanding the scope of the prohibition to also cover cases where the victim
voluntarily became intoxicated (emphasis omitted)).
133 See TRACEY ET AL., supra note 17, at 26–27 (noting that in thirty-eight states
out of the forty jurisdictions whose intoxication provisions do not cover voluntary
intoxication, prosecution of rapes involving intoxicated victims is possible under general
incapacitation prohibitions).
134 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (2013) (prohibiting intercourse “through
the use of the complaining witness’s mental incapacity or physical helplessness”); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2012) (providing that the defendant must know
that the victim was “unable to understand the nature of the act or [was] unable to give
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describe the typical characteristics of intoxicated victims,
namely, incapacitation or inability to appraise or control conduct
or communicate their unwillingness to engage in sexual
intercourse.135 Under incapacity-to-consent statutes, consent to
intercourse cannot be obtained if a person lacks the capacity to
engage in a decision-making process; therefore a victim’s
incapacitation negates the element of consent, showing that the
intercourse was nonconsensual.136
At first glance, it may seem that statutes in both
categories, specifically, statutes that directly criminalize
intercourse with intoxicated persons and statutes that draw on
the incapacitation language, reach a similar result. Both ground
criminalization in the incapacity-to-consent standard, albeit by
focusing on different features: While statutes that criminalize
intercourse with an incapacitated person, without mentioning
intoxication, focus on the effects of the victim’s inability to
appraise the circumstances of an incident—the inability to
consent regardless of its cause—statutes that directly criminalize
intercourse with an intoxicated person focus on the cause of a
victim’s inability to express consent, that is, intoxication.137
One important feature, however, separates the two
categories of statutes. While prohibitions that directly criminalize
sexual intercourse with an intoxicated person mostly exclude
voluntary intoxication from their coverage, prohibitions that
criminalize intercourse with an incapacitated person do not
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary intoxication
since intoxication is not specifically listed as the reason for the
incapacitation. Importantly, the general prohibition against
intercourse with an incapacitated person equally applies not only
in cases where the victim was duped into incapacitation but also
in cases where he or she voluntarily became heavily intoxicated.
Arguably, the problem of excluding sexual assault of
voluntarily intoxicated victims from the scope of the laws’
protection appears to be solved if criminal charges could be
brought under the general incapacitation statutes. In fact, this
is precisely what is currently being done as prosecutors use
knowing consent”); ALA. CODE 1975 § 13A-6-70(c) (1975) (proscribing that a person is
“deemed incapable of consent” if he is mentally incapacitated); IOWA CODE § 709.4 (2015)
(“A person commits sexual abuse in the third degree when the person performs a sex
act . . . . The other person is suffering from a mental defect or incapacity which precludes
giving consent.”).
135 See TRACEY ET AL., supra note 17, at 25.
136 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
1201, 1209 (2015) (defining mental incapacity as lacking the “requisite psychological
abilities to engage in autonomous decision-making”).
137 See TRACEY ET AL., supra note 17, at 25.
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incapacity-to-consent statutes to bring criminal charges in
cases involving sexual assaults of voluntarily intoxicated
victims.138 Despite the fact that intoxication is not specifically
mentioned, these statutes are used to prosecute sexual assault
of intoxicated victims on the theory that intercourse with an
incapacitated person is prohibited regardless of how the
incapacitation occurred.139
The fact that the above prosecutions are not rare might
lead to the conclusion that there is no need to amend existing
law by directly prohibiting the sexual assault of voluntarily
intoxicated victims. Conceivably, a statutory change is seemingly
unnecessary if the current law already covers these cases. This
conclusion, however, is wrong because prosecuting sexual assault
of severely intoxicated victims based on general incapacity-toconsent statutes raises significant problems of its own. The
difficulties mainly stem from the vague and ambiguous concept of
“incapacity to consent,” and the fact that there is no consensus
among courts on how to define such incapacity. The following part
explains how a critical difficulty concerns the incapacity-toconsent standard’s shortcomings when applied to cases involving
intoxicated victims. Therefore, even if these statutes allegedly
protect victims of voluntary intoxication, applying the incapacityto-consent standard is fraught with problems.
III.

CRITIQUE OF THE INCAPACITY-TO-CONSENT STANDARD

In most jurisdictions, the prevalent legal construct that
allows the prosecution of sexual assault of voluntarily
intoxicated victims draws on provisions that prohibit sexual
intercourse with incapacitated individuals.140 While these
provisions do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
intoxication, their applications raise other sets of problems due
to the vague concept of “incapacity to consent.” Jurisdictions
vary in the specific formulations used to capture the essence of
the victim’s incapacitated state; some statutes prohibit sexual
penetration when the actor knows that the victim is unable to
understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing
consent.141 Other statutes define incapacity as either complete
138 See, e.g., People v. Mercado, 2016 IL App (1st) 140303-U, ¶ 28 (affirming the
defendant’s conviction for criminal sexual assault of a voluntarily intoxicated victim).
139 See, e.g., Molina v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 470, 473 (Va. 2006) (defining
mental incapacity to cover intoxication).
140 See supra Section II.B.2.
141 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2012) (stating that
defendant must know the victim was “unable to understand the nature of the act or [was]
unable to give knowing consent”).
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inability to appraise or control behavior or substantial
impairment in such ability.142 Some prohibit subjecting “another
person to sexual contact when that person is incapacitated,
incapable of consent, or lacks the capacity to consent.”143 Yet
others only criminalize intercourse when “the complainant is
unconscious or the person knows that the complainant is
unaware that the penetration is occurring.”144 The discussion
below collectively refers to these various formulations of
incapacity to consent standards as ITCS.
The various definitions given by courts to the notion of
incapacity and the perplexing array of tests adopted to determine
the circumstances that amount to incapacity to consent to sexual
intercourse result in ample ambiguity in their application.
Notably, there is no consensus among the jurisdictions regarding
the definition of “incapacity,” with some jurisdictions defining
incapacity as victim’s inability to understand the nature of the
sexual act and others defining incapacity as victim’s inability to
appraise or control his conduct.145
Additionally, formulations that draw on the ITCS prove
particularly problematic in cases where the victim’s intoxication
did not render him or her completely unconscious, yet did result
in a significant impairment in the ability to communicate
nonconsent. Consumption of intoxicants may undermine the
complainant’s ability to express refusal to the sexual act,
without rendering him or her completely incapable of
understanding the nature of the sexual act altogether. In these
cases, victims may not be protected because the level of their
intoxication fell short of complete incapacity to appraise the
nature of the sexual act. The result is that the cases that are
prosecuted are mainly those where the victim completely lost
consciousness.146 Allegations involving victims whose abilities to
142 See DeMatteo et al., supra note 105, at 235 (discussing statutes that cover
victims’ temporary incapacity to consent to intercourse, including, among others, due to
voluntary intoxication).
143 See MO. REV. STAT. § 566.100 (2016) (prohibiting subjecting “another person
to sexual contact when that person is incapacitated, incapable of consent, or lacks the
capacity to consent”).
144 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3125(a)(4).
145 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(j)(3) (2015) (defining “without
consent” among others, to mean: “The defendant knew that the victim suffered from a
cognitive disability, mental illness or mental defect which rendered the victim incapable
of appraising the nature of the sexual conduct or incapable of consenting.”); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3) (1970) (defining “mental incapacity” to mean: “[T]hat condition of the
complaining witness existing at the time of an offense under this article which prevents
the complaining witness from understanding the nature or consequences of the sexual act
involved in such offense and about which the accused knew or should have known.”).
146 See State v. Rogers, 772 So. 2d 960, 962, 965 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding
conviction of the defendant of raping a voluntarily intoxicated victim who lost
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communicate refusal to intercourse are significantly impaired
due to intoxicants, but did not lose consciousness, and were
considered legally capable of consenting, are rarely prosecuted.147
The following sections demonstrate the ways in which
the ITCS provides only a partial and incomplete solution to the
complex problem of sexual assault of intoxicated victims.148 The
ITCS suffers from two types of drawbacks. The first concerns the
inherent difficulty of demarcating the line between intoxication
that is sufficiently severe to significantly impair one’s physical
and mental abilities, and complete incapacitation. The second
concerns the vague, ambiguous, and indeterminate formulations
used by courts to define incapacitation, which sometime result in
overinclusiveness but other times in underinclusiveness.
A.

The Blurry Line Between Intoxication and Incapacitation

Courts have long noted that “there are many levels of
intoxication, and the fact of intoxication, by itself, does not
necessarily mean that the individual in question is incapable of
deciding whether to assent to a sexual encounter.”149 Courts have
further emphasized that the line between intoxication, or mere
drunkenness, and actual impairment in mental and physical
capabilities is fuzzy and is therefore unable to provide a clear
guideline for evaluating the validity of the victim’s consent.150
An inquiry into an intoxicated person’s capabilities rests
on the premise that incapacitation is a debilitating state that
goes above and beyond mere intoxication. But articulating the
operational boundary between intoxication and incapacitation
proves elusive, with the line between these situations often
becoming blurred. Considerable ambiguity stems from the fact
that incapacitation is not a term that easily lends itself to a
bright-line rule but instead is determined by applying a more
flexible standard.151 Likewise, incapacitation cannot always be
traced to a specifically defined moment; accurately discerning a
precise point in time in which a person becomes completely
incapacitated, rather than merely intoxicated, is not a feasible
consciousness); see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 96, at 456–57 (discussing prosecutions
involving total impairment resulting in unconsciousness).
147 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 96, at 457 & n.98.
148 See infra Section III.B (criticizing the application of the incapacity-to-consent
standard).
149 Commonwealth v. Blache, 880 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Mass. 2008) (citing the
court’s 1870 decision in Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376 (1870)).
150 State v. Hatten, 927 N.E.2d 632, 638–39 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (noting that
“there can be a fine, fuzzy, and subjective line between intoxication and impairment”).
151 People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
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task. Instead, incapacitation lies on a spectrum that ranges from
total incapacitation—amounting to complete unconsciousness—
to substantial impairment in cognitive and mental functioning
while still maintaining consciousness.152 Additionally, there is a
difference between passing out to the point of unconsciousness
and “blacking out,” which may result in temporary loss of some
memories but does not lead to complete unconsciousness.153
The concept of physical and mental impairment plays a
critical role in understanding the range of conditions that
intoxication may lead to;154 in its most extreme form, the level
of a victim’s impairment rises to total incapacitation, which is
captured in the state of complete unconsciousness. But the more
complicated situations involve cases where the severity and level
of a person’s impairment result in significant deterioration in
cognitive and motor abilities yet fall short of total
incapacitation.155 In these cases, a victim’s ability to communicate
nonconsent to sexual intercourse is significantly undermined by
his or her impaired mental and physical state, even if not
completely destroyed156 Yet, under the ITCS, significant
impairment, as opposed to full incapacitation, may not suffice to
render the victim legally incapable of consenting.157
Furthermore, determining in hindsight whether the
victim’s intoxication at the time the sexual act occurred rose
above the level of heavy intoxication to actual incapacitation
involves much speculation. In contrast with driving under the
influence charges, in which scientific tests are used to quantify
a defendant’s blood alcohol content at the time of driving, a
sexual assault victim’s precise level of intoxication at the time of
intercourse typically cannot be accurately measured given the

152 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 96, at 456–57 (noting that “intoxication cases
range between total incapacitation and impairment that is severe, but not complete”).
153 See Aaron M. White, What Happened? Alcohol, Memory Blackouts, and the
Brain, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/
publications/arh27-2/186-196.htm [https://perma.cc/3UZG-Y99N].
154 See infra Section V.B.1 (elaborating further on the concept of significant
impairment and incorporating it into the proposed statute).
155 See Commonwealth v. Urban, 880 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. 2008).
156 Id. at 756 (The defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with a victim who
was conscious. She testified that she was “really drunk,” had no energy, felt physically
paralyzed, said nothing because she was scared, could not move, and was unable to
push him away. The court reversed the conviction because the trial court failed to
instruct the jury that an extreme degree of intoxication was necessary for finding that
the victim lacked the capacity to consent.).
157 Id. at 757 (positing that the incapacity-to-consent construct obscures the key
question of whether the victim actually consented and recognizes only full impairment as
legal incapacity).
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lapse of time between intercourse and medical exams.158 Therefore,
juries do not have a quantifiable measure to assess the precise
degree of the victim’s intoxication at the time of the offense.
Given this uncertainty, determining whether the
victim’s level of intoxication exceeded mere drunkenness and
amounted to incapacitation cannot be guided by a bright-line
rule that clearly demarcates the point at which intoxication
becomes incapacitation. Instead, assessing the victim’s mental
capabilities involves a totality of the circumstances, open-ended
evaluation, which may result in unpredictable determinations.159
B.

Vague Formulations for Determining Incapacitation

Any legal standard that draws on the ITCS to
demarcate the boundary between lawful intercourse and a sex
crime must incorporate “a test for determining when [the
victim’s] intoxication reaches a level that should be considered
incapacitating.”160 Under statutes that make incapacity an
independent element of the crime of sexual assault, the
prosecution must prove that the level of the victim’s intoxication
was so severe that it rendered him or her incapable of
consenting to intercourse.161 The problem with the ITCS,
however, is that it is unable to offer practical guidelines for
assessing the point at which a person’s impairment amounts to
incapacitating intoxication. While various tests are used by the
states in an attempt to determine when intoxication becomes
incapacitation,162 their application proves problematic, as the
sections below will demonstrate.
Case law demonstrates that the ITCS is ill-suited for
prosecutions of sexual assault of intoxicated victims because it
leads to inequitable resolutions from both victims’ and
defendants’ perspectives. The standard often proves overinclusive,
158 See Sharon Cowan, The Trouble with Drink: Intoxication, (In)capacity, and
Evaporation of Consent to Sex, 41 AKRON L. REV. 899, 902 (2008) (arguing that it is difficult
to assess incapacity because alcohol effects wear off).
159 People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 318–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(reversing defendant’s conviction because there was sufficient evidence that the
victim’s level of intoxication did not prevent her from consenting to the sexual acts).
160 MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3, cmt.
4, at 63 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015), https://www.ali.org/publications/
show/sexual-assault-and-related-offenses/#drafts.
161 Commonwealth v. Urban, 880 N.E.2d 753, 757–58 (Mass. 2008) (holding
that where the Commonwealth seeks to satisfy the element of lack of consent by proof
that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent, the jury must find not just that
she was intoxicated, but that her degree of intoxication was such that it rendered her
incapable of consenting to intercourse).
162 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3,
cmt. 4, at 63–64 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015).
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potentially allowing criminalization where culpability seems
ambiguous, but other times proves underinclusive, precluding
criminal sanctions in cases where wrongdoing is unequivocal.163
The following sections demonstrate the ways in which applying
this standard fails to reach just resolutions for both parties.
1. Overinclusiveness of the ITCS
One of the ITCS’s shortcomings is its potential for
overinclusiveness. Viewed through a defendant’s lens,
applying this standard may lead to unpredictable decisions
and overcriminalize sexual encounters falling short of
culpable conduct. The following reasons explain why the
guideless standard results in ample ambiguity for defendants
whose criminal responsibility hinges on whether they were
aware that their sexual partners’ intoxication levels rose to
that of actual incapacitation.
a. Lack of a Determinative Test for Assessing
Incapacitation
The ITCS, standing alone, is unhelpful in providing
factfinders with workable guidelines, as it begs the question of
how to determine incapacity. This standard therefore calls for
adopting a separate test to determine at which point the victim’s
intoxication rises to the level of actual incapacitation.164 However,
some courts, such as the Kansas Supreme Court in its decision in
State v. Chaney, declined to adopt a dispositive test.165 In Chaney,
the defendant was charged with two counts of rape.166 First, he
was charged with intercourse with a victim who was “incapable
of giving consent because of the effect of any alcoholic liquor,
narcotic, drug or other substance, which condition was known by
the offender or was reasonably apparent to the offender” (rape
by intoxication).167 He was also charged with rape by force or
fear, but the jury acquitted him on this count, convicting him
only of rape by intoxication.168 On appeal, Chaney argued that
163 See infra Sections III.B.1.b, III.B.2.b (discussing the Giardino case that
illustrates the overinclusiveness of the incapacity-to-consent standard and the Urban
case that illustrates the underinclusiveness of this standard).
164 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3,
cmt. 5, at 58 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014), https://www.ali.org/projects/
show/sexual-assault-and-related-offenses/.
165 State v. Chaney, 5 P.3d 492, 498 (Kan. 2000).
166 Id. at 492, 494–95.
167 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (repealed 2011) (criminalizing intercourse with
an intoxicated person, whether voluntary or involuntary); Chaney, 5 P.3d at 494–95.
168 Chaney, 5 P.3d at 495, 502.
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he could not be convicted of the rape by intoxication charge
because of the fact that the victim said “‘no’ and called out for
help, shows that she was both sober enough to refuse sex and
sober enough to consent to sex.”169 The court of appeals agreed
and reversed the conviction.170 Following the state’s appeal to
the Kansas Supreme Court, the conviction was reinstated
based on the conclusion that given the victim’s substantial
impairment due to alcohol, she was incapable of consenting.171
The facts of this case are particularly disturbing because
the eighteen-year-old defendant raped the fourteen-year-old
victim while she was in the care of a babysitter who invited the
defendant to the victim’s home.172 The defendant brought beer
with him, which the victim voluntarily consumed until she
became very intoxicated and went to her bedroom.173 Defendant
followed her.174 Despite her intoxication, the victim repeatedly
said “no” and tried to call out to the babysitter for help.175
To be clear, my analysis below neither suggests that the
conclusion reached by the Kansas Supreme Court is mistaken,
nor that Chaney’s conviction given the egregious facts above was
unjustified. Instead, my critique of the court’s decision rests
merely on the court’s treatment of the ITCS and particularly on
its refusal to provide a definitive test that would guide juries’
discretion in future cases.
While the court rejected the defendant’s position that a
person is only incapable of giving consent due to the effects of
alcohol if that person is so intoxicated as to be near the point of
either passing out or blacking out, it refused to clarify when
intoxication becomes incapacitation. Noting that “incapacity to
consent is a highly subjective concept,” and that “[i]t is not one
which lends itself to definition as a matter of law,” the court did
not define the degree of intoxication required to sustain a rape
conviction under this statute.176 The court noted that “[l]ay
persons are familiar with the effects of alcohol. If the jury
concluded [the victim] was drunk enough to be unable to consent
to sex, we should give great deference to that finding.”177
The problem with courts’ refusal to adopt a definitive
test for determining victims’ incapacity to consent is that juries
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id. at 493.
Id.
Id. at 493–94, 499.
Id. at 493.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 493–94, 496.
Id. at 498.
Id.
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are left with no clear guidelines for evaluating incapacitation.
Equally troubling is the fact that potential defendants are also
not provided with any substantive direction that would help
shape future sexual behavior. While clearly this was not a
concern in Chaney itself, given the defendant’s awareness of
the victim’s nonconsent, the court’s refusal to elaborate on the
proper test for incapacity poses a concern for future cases. The
Chaney court opted for an open-ended “we know it when we
see” inquiry, which is, in essence, a guideless totality of the
circumstances test. Under this test, the victim’s testimony
regarding both how much alcohol he or she consumed and his
or her level of impairment, as well as witnesses’ testimonies
regarding the victim’s visible signs of impairment, play a
critical role.178 But the court’s refusal to further elaborate on
the precise test for determining incapacity to consent leaves to
the jury the task of inferring the circumstances under which a
victim was too intoxicated to consent to sex. It requires them to
assess the victim’s capabilities based on roughly estimating his
or her precise level of intoxication at the time of the event. In
sum, the refusal to provide a dispositive test for when a victim is
incapable of consenting might not only leave juries without
direction but also result in inconsistencies in applying the ITCS.
b. Expanding Incapacity Beyond Cognitive Impairment
While some courts refuse to articulate a definitive test
that would provide some structure to the indeterminate ITCS,
others acknowledge the need to better constrain juries’
discretion by offering some guidelines concerning what features
are incorporated into the incapacity inquiry. None of the
criteria developed by courts, however, provide clear guidelines
on how to determine when a victim’s intoxication has reached
the level that renders him or her incapacitated.179
The prevalent criteria adopted by most jurisdictions are
vague and unhelpful. At one end of the spectrum lie tests that
opt for a narrow reading of what capacity to consent means.180
178 Id. at 498–99 (detailing the victim’s testimony as well as the babysitter’s
who witnessed the victim’s intoxication). One of the problems characterizing the
prosecution of sexual assault of intoxicated victims is that unlike charges involving
driving under the influence where scientific evidence about the defendant’s blood
alcohol content is readily available, scientifically measuring the victim’s BAC is often
inaccurate or even impossible given the fact that it is not measured at the time of the
sexual act itself. See Cowan, supra note 158, at 907–08.
179 See TRACEY ET AL., supra note 17, at 27 (noting that none of the
prohibitions “set forth clear guidelines or specific factors to determine whether a
victim’s level of intoxication precludes consent”).
180 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 136, at 1217–21.
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Under these tests, the inquiry focuses on evaluating a victim’s
cognitive abilities “to understand the nature and consequences”
of the sexual act.181 Cognitive capacity only incorporates the
victim’s ability to understand the physical aspects of the sexual
activity, namely, that the conduct is sexual in nature, as well
as its physical consequences—mainly the risks of pregnancy
and sexually transmitted diseases.182
Other jurisdictions, however, have broadened the
incapacity inquiry by also asking whether the intoxication
negates or substantially impairs the ability of the victim to
control or appraise his or her conduct.183 It remains unclear,
however, precisely what elements this phrase encompasses.184
Arguably, the ability to “appraise conduct” requires that the
victim also understand the additional consequences of the
sexual act, including its nonphysical aspects, such as the
psychological and emotional ramifications as well as its moral
nature.185 Therefore, a victim may be deemed incapable of
consenting if he or she lacks the capacity to evaluate the
broader social implications of the sexual encounter, which are
inherently subjective in nature.
The decision of the California Court of Appeals in People
v. Giardino provides an example of the expansion of the scope
of the incapacity inquiry to include additional aspects of
impairment beyond cognitive ones.186 In this case, the defendant
was convicted of rape by intoxication.187 The complexity of this
case stemmed from the fact that the complainant did not merely
passively acquiesce to the sexual acts but seemingly actively
participated in them.188 On appeal, the defendant argued that
the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the
meaning of the term “prevented from resisting” and on lack of

Id.
Id. at 1218.
183 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(A) (2016) (prohibiting gross
sexual assault when the actor engages in a sexual act with a person who is unable to
appraise or control conduct).
184 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
§ 213.3, cmt. 4, at 64 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
185 See, e.g., Kansas v. Chaney, 5 P.3d 492, 498 (Kan. 2000) (noting that the
victim “exhibited little indicia of rational decision-making” and that she “was both
psychologically and physiologically impaired”).
186 People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 324 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
187 Id. at 319; see CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 261(a)(3) (2013) (defining rape to
include “[w]here a person is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic
substance, or any controlled substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably
should have been known by the accused”).
188 Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 325–26 (describing the victim volunteering to
take off her clothes and masturbate).
181
182
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consent as an element of the crime.189 The court accepted the
defendant’s former argument but rejected the latter.190
The court held that the element “prevented from
resisting” refers to the effects of the intoxicants on the victim’s
powers of judgment and ability to give legal consent.191 It
further held that the incapacity sufficient to support conviction
could be established by showing that the victim was either
“unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or
harmfulness of the conduct” or would not have engaged in
intercourse with the defendant had she not been under the
influence of the intoxicants.192 The court further interpreted the
“reasonable judgment” element as the ability “to understand
and weigh not only the physical nature of the act, but also its
moral character and probable consequences.”193
The Giardino court’s two alternative bases for
determining incapacity are disconcerting because of their
potentially overbroad scope. The court’s ambiguous test neither
clarifies what “harmfulness of the conduct” means nor what the
victim’s grasping of the moral implications of engaging in the
sexual act entails. Expanding the victim’s ability to exercise
“reasonable judgment” as to the moral character of a sexual act
allows jurors and judges to pass judgment on the sexual
encounter at issue. Inviting factfinders to incorporate vague
moral considerations into the incapacity inquiry is dangerous
because moral intuitions are measured against societal
perceptions and are highly subjective in nature.194 Introducing
the notion of morality into the inquiry runs the risk that juries
and judges will incorporate their own normative judgments
concerning the moral implications of the sexual act.195 Since case
law does not provide any guidelines on how the inability to
appraise the moral harmfulness of the sexual act is interpreted,
juries and judges remain free to apply their own understandings
of what features this test encompasses.
Likewise, the requirement that the victim is able to
make a “reasonable judgment” is also troubling. Incorporating
Id. at 319.
Id. at 324 (holding that the trial court failed to correctly instruct the jury);
id. at 328 (holding that defendant’s belief in the victim’s consent was irrelevant).
191 Id. at 321.
192 Id. at 321–22 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(b) (AM. LAW INST.,
Proposed Official Draft 1962) (citing People v. Ing, 65 Cal. 2d 603, 604 (1965) for the
proposition that the victim would not have engaged in intercourse had she not been
under the influence of intoxicants)).
193 Id. at 324.
194 See Boni-Saenez, supra note 136, at 1221–22.
195 Id. (noting that putting judges in charge of sexual judgments risks the
chance that they will prohibit certain forms of nontraditional sexual expression).
189
190
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the reasonableness language into the incapacity-to-consent test
does not provide any substantive criterion because it remains
unclear what reasonableness entails in the context of the choice
to engage in sexual acts and why such choice has to be
reasonable at all.
Furthermore, the test’s second basis, which requires a
“but-for” causal connection between the intoxication and the
sexual act, is also problematic. Admittedly, many sexual
encounters that are perfectly consensual would not have occurred
but for the consumption of intoxicants. The “but-for” requirement
risks turning every case of regrettable intoxicated sex into a sex
crime. It is a moralistic standard that does not comport with
prevailing social practices and is therefore impermissible.196
c. Invalidating Consent
Another problem in the ITCS concerns its treatment of
cases involving seemingly tangible but intoxicated consent. In
the Giardino case, the complainant appeared to communicate
positive willingness to engage in the sexual act, yet her
extreme state of intoxication raised concerns that her consent
was invalid.197 Rejecting the defendant’s argument that the
trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that lack of
consent was an element of the offense, the Giardino court held
that nonconsent was not an element of the crime of rape by
intoxication.198 It further clarified that the issue was not
whether the victim actually consented, but whether he or she
was capable of exercising the degree of judgment a person must
have in order to give “legally cognizable consent.”199
Applying this holding to the facts of the Giardino case
itself has led the court to conclude that the victim’s level of
intoxication did not preclude her from expressing valid consent.200
Application of the same standard in future cases might lead to
invalidating
a
complainant’s
affirmative
and
clearly
communicated consent, however, based on the theory that it was
tainted due to the victim’s intoxication. The result would be
unjustly convicting defendants of sexual offenses even where
explicit permission to the sexual act had been verbally given.
196 See supra Part I (discussing the prevalence of alcohol consumption as part
of today’s “hookup” culture).
197 Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 326–27; see also Goodman, supra note 86, at
88–89 (discussing cases involving “explicit but inebriated consent”).
198 Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 321.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 327–28 (noting that there was ample evidence that the victim
consented to sex).
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Expanding the incapacity-to-consent inquiry to cover
cases where actual consent is expressed is unwarranted.
Invalidating an intoxicated person’s unequivocal communication
of willingness to engage in a sexual act extends above and
beyond the goals of statutes aimed at protecting victims whose
ability to communicate nonconsent was significantly impaired
due to their intoxication. Negating consent may not only result
in criminalizing innocuous behaviors, when an actor relies on a
partner’s express assent to sex, but it is also notably
paternalistic, raising concerns that the law impermissibly
interferes with this partner’s sexual behavior in circumstances
where the partner might be making less than prudent decisions
that would not have made had the partner’s judgment not been
clouded by intoxication.
2. Underinclusiveness of the ITCS
While applying the ITCS may result in inequitable
resolution from the defendants’ perspective, other times it may
prove unfair when viewed through the victims’ lens. Therefore,
the
standard
is
also
underinclusive,
leading
to
undercriminalization of sexual acts that warrant criminal
sanction, as illustrated below.
a. Focusing on Victims’ Capacities Rather than on
Nonconsent
A key drawback in the ITCS is that in overemphasizing
the victim’s mental capabilities at the time of the sexual act, it
wrongly diverts attention away from the act’s nonconsensual
nature. Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer argued that under the
incapacity standard, the analysis is improperly shifted from
inquiring into the victim’s consent to the intercourse to
examining whether he or she was incapable of consenting,
excessively emphasizing the level of intoxication.201 In doing so,
continues Tuerkheimer, juries and judges fail to inquire into
whether the victim actually consented, which is what courts
should be looking at in these cases.202
Dubious outcomes may occur in cases where despite
their heavily intoxicated state, victims were still able to verbally
refuse the sexual act. The risk is that the victim’s explicit verbal
refusal would be understood as an indication that he or she was
201 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 25–29 (noting that the inquiry into the
victim’s consent is replaced by fixating on the level of intoxication).
202 Id.
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capable of consenting. In these cases, applying the ITCS might
lead courts and juries to the conclusion that the victim was not
incapacitated and therefore no sexual assault had occurred.203
The decision of the Kansas Court of Appeals in State v.
Chaney, mentioned earlier, is an example of the conflation of
the victim’s verbal refusal to sex with her capacity to consent.204
As previously noted, the victim testified that while she was “very
well intoxicated,” she did, in fact, say “no,” explicitly refusing the
sexual act.205 The court of appeals reversed the conviction on the
theory that the victim’s ability to express nonconsent shows that
she was not legally incapable of giving consent.206 Specifically,
the court of appeals observed that:
While there was an abundance of evidence that K.G. may have been
intoxicated or drunk, there is no evidence that she was unable to
consent to sexual relations as a result of the intoxicating
liquor. . . . “Consent is a two-edged sword; on the one side is consent
and on the other is refusal to consent. If the victim can do one, he or
she can do either. . . . An individual who has the ability to say no and
refuse to consent to sex can also say yes and consent to the act.”207

The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed with the court of
appeals’ construction of the incapacity provision and reinstated
the defendant’s conviction.208 The court stressed that “[i]t [was]
not outside the realm of reason to think that a victim can be too
drunk to provide valid consent to sex yet remain capable, on
some level, of rejecting unwanted aggression.”209 It concluded
that “[t]here was sufficient evidence that [the victim] was both
psychologically and physiologically impaired due to the effects
of alcohol,” even if she was able to say “no.”210 The court further
observed that the victim’s saying “no” could have been “an
instinctual response rather than the result of rational decisionmaking,” and that the victim here “did not have the clarity of
thought [that] the Court of Appeals attributed to her,” thus the

203 The problem here rests with most laws’ insistence on proof of force, where
there is no sufficient evidence of full incapacitation. Most jurisdictions still define rape
by requiring a force element in addition to nonconsent, unless the victim is completely
incapacitated, therefore making the force requirement unnecessary. Id. at 15–16 (observing
that most jurisdictions include a force element in their definitions of rape).
204 The court of appeals’ decision is unpublished but is cited in the decision of
the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Chaney, 5 P.3d 492, 493 (Kan. 2000).
205 Id. at 498.
206 Id. at 493.
207 Id. at 493, 496, 500.
208 Id. at 496–98.
209 Id. at 496.
210 Id. at 498.
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conviction on the theory of being “unable to consent because of
the effects of alcohol [was] supported by the evidence.”211
The dissenting judge, however, agreed with the court of
appeals’ interpretation of the statute, observing that the ITCS
was irrelevant in this case because the victim clearly expressed
her nonconsent to the defendant.212 The dissenting judge
further opined that while there was no evidence to support the
rape conviction based on the incapacity-to-consent theory,
there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant based on
the alternative theory, which was rape by force or fear.213
While in Chaney itself, Kansas’s high court eventually
cured the absurd outcome that acquittal of the defendant would
have entailed, the opinions of the court of appeals and the
dissenting judge in the Kansas Supreme Court demonstrate
the potentially dangerous implications of focusing on the
capacity to consent rather than on the nonconsensual nature of
the sexual act. Arguably, given less egregious facts, a jury
would have concluded that the intercourse was consensual
because the evidence did not prove that the victim’s condition
amounted to incapacitation.
b. Setting a High Threshold
The ITCS sets a high threshold for determining when
an impaired victim could not have consented to a sexual act
due to intoxication. Linguistically, the word “incapacitation”
denotes a total loss of mental and physical capacities, even if
temporarily.214 Defining incapacity in terms of lack of
capabilities precludes conditions where capabilities were
significantly impaired but not completely lacking from the scope
of coverage. This intuitive understanding supports the position
that intoxicated victims might be considered incapacitated only
when their cognitive and physical impairment reached or neared
complete loss or lack of any capabilities. The ITCS, therefore,
captures the most extreme forms of incapacitation, specifically,
cases where victims completely lost consciousness. But it may
Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 499–500.
213 Id. at 494–95, 499–500, 502 (observing that “it was unfortunate the jury
acquitted the defendant of rape by force or fear” and that “why the jury did not convict
him of that offense is a mystery”). Just to clarify, Kansas’s law also defined the crime of
rape to include nonconsensual sexual intercourse when the victim was overcome by
force or fear. While the state charged rape based both on the force or fear option and
the incapacity-to-consent construct, the jury rejected the former option.
214 See the definition of incapacity in Black’s Law Dictionary: “1. Lack of
physical or mental capabilities. 2. Lack of ability to have certain legal consequences
attach to one’s actions.” Incapacity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
211

212
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not cover cases where the victim was too sober to completely lose
consciousness yet impaired enough to compromise her ability to
communicate opposition to the sexual act.215
Scholars have long criticized the ITCS, arguing that it
fails to adequately protect voluntarily intoxicated victims.216
Scholars also note that while in cases where the complainant
had lost consciousness it is assumed that she did not have the
capacity to consent, in cases where victims are “drunk short of
the point of unconsciousness” complex problems arise in the
prosecution, particularly given the fact that evaluating the
precise level of intoxication is hard to measure after the fact
where there are “no other witnesses[’] accounts.”217
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Urban exemplifies the high threshold used
to determine incapacitation.218 In this case, the defendant and
the victim had been drinking together at a bar, eventually
arriving at the defendant’s apartment where the victim fell
asleep.219 The defendant volunteered to drive her home and she
fell asleep in the car, awakening only after he began kissing
her.220 The victim testified that the defendant had oral and
vaginal sex with her in the parked car, and that she was
“‘really drunk,’ had no energy, felt physically paralyzed, said
nothing because she was scared, could not move, and was
unable to push [defendant] off.”221 After the jury convicted the
defendant of rape, he appealed, challenging the jury’s
instructions on the evidence needed to establish that the victim
lacked the capacity to consent.222 The Massachusetts Supreme
215 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 96, at 457 (discussing the different treatment of
cases involving complete unconsciousness and those involving significant impairment in
communicative capacities falling short of unconsciousness).
216 See Falk, supra note 20, at 191 (noting that many existing statutes create
ambiguity, as it is unclear whether voluntary intoxicated victims are protected), id. 197–
201 (discussing the drawbacks in statutes that focus on victim’s incapacity to resist
sexual intercourse); see also Boni-Saenz, supra note 136, at 1219 & n.95 (noting that tests
that focus on inability to understand the nature of the sexual act may leave intoxicated
victims underprotected particularly where both parties were voluntarily intoxicated).
217 See Cowan, supra note 158, at 917–18 (noting that where the complainant
has experienced symptoms like “periods of unconsciousness,” it may be assumed that she
did not have the capacity to consent, but where victim’s intoxication is short of
unconsciousness, there is broad room “for the defendant and the victim to disagree about
the degree of intoxication and incapacity”).
218 Commonwealth v. Urban, 880 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. 2008).
219 Id. at 755–56.
220 Id. at 756.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 757. The defendant was charged under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265,
§ 22(b) which is a general rape statute requiring proof of both force and nonconsent. The
incapacity-to-consent standard was incorporated into the judge’s instruction to the jury.
Urban, 880 N.E.2d at 754, 757.
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Judicial Court reversed defendant’s conviction because the trial
court’s charge failed to clarify to the jury that an extreme
degree of intoxication was required to support the rape
conviction before the incapacity rule could apply.223
The Urban court did not further clarify how to determine
the point at which intoxication becomes sufficiently extreme to
satisfy the ITCS. Importantly, in this case, the victim was
conscious during the sexual intercourse, thus not completely
incapacitated.224 Yet, her testimony clearly demonstrated that
her ability to communicate nonconsent to the intercourse was
significantly impaired.225 The court did not provide any
guidelines on whether such impairment would satisfy the
“incapacity-to-consent” requirement. But the court’s construction
of the ITCS, requiring that the victim’s level of intoxication be
extreme, adopted a narrow basis for evaluating the victim’s
impairment. The case illustrates the ways in which courts
struggle to identify the threshold for incapacity short of complete
unresponsiveness in cases involving highly intoxicated yet not
fully unconscious complainants.
Because of the rigidity of the ITCS, courts tend to
construe the standard as covering only cases where victims
were in a condition in which they were at least nearing a state
of full unconsciousness.226 The ITCS may, therefore, lead to
juries and judges wrongly concluding that victims’ intoxication
did not reach the point of legal incapacitation in cases where
they did not lose consciousness. Additionally, it may also lead
to prosecutors’ unwillingness to bring criminal charges in cases
where the victim’s intoxication did not result in complete
unconsciousness. Indeed, review of the case law suggests that
most prosecutions of sexual assault of intoxicated victims
involve complainants who actually lost consciousness or drifted
in and out of consciousness.227
In sum, application of the ITCS may leave victims of
voluntary intoxication beyond the scope of sexual assault laws’
protection, particularly in cases falling short of complete
unconsciousness, where intoxication was sufficiently severe to
significantly impair their communication abilities and preclude
them from effectively opposing sexual intercourse.
Id. at 758–59.
See id. at 756.
225 Id.
226 See, e.g., State v. Jones, 804 N.W.2d 409, 414 (S.D. 2011) (noting that the
line should be drawn “between conscious intoxication and incapacitating intoxication”).
227 See, e.g., State v. Snow, 70 A.3d 971, 971–72 (Vt. 2013); State v. Valanos,
No. 03-01-0052, 2010 WL 272592, at *2, *4 (N.J. 2010).
223
224
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c. Judging Victims and Placing Blame
The ITCS embraces a victim-oriented, rather than a
perpetrator-oriented inquiry.228 By defining the crime as
intercourse with an incapacitated person, rather than
nonconsensual intercourse with an intoxicated person, criminal
wrongdoing is defined solely by reference to the victim’s
condition.229 Making the victim’s incapacitation the focal point of
the crime results in diverting the focus away from the perpetrator’s
culpable conduct, which is engaging in nonconsensual sex with a
person whose ability to verbally or physically consent to it was
significantly impaired.
In general, rape prohibitions are anomalous compared
to other offenses in the sense that they are defined by reference
to the victim’s response to the offending conduct rather than by
identifying the perpetrator’s culpable conduct.230 Assessing and
implicitly judging victims’ choices and behaviors is a unique
feature of sexual assault statutes.231 The ITCS further
contributes to shifting the focus of the inquiry in a criminal
trial from the defendant’s culpable conduct towards judging
victims and placing blame on them due to their decisions to
render themselves incapacitated.
Additionally, the ITCS shapes police officers’,
prosecutors’, judges’, and juries’ perceptions of the case.232
Instead of focusing on scrutinizing the defendant’s conduct, the
victim and her precise level of intoxication become the center of
decision-maker’s attention. The courts treat a victim’s incapacity
228 See Janine Benedet, The Sexual Assault of Intoxicated Women, 22 CANADIAN
J. WOMEN & L. 435, 444 (2010) (observing that while considering the question of the
victim’s incapacity to consent, courts often focus on the victim’s fault in becoming
intoxicated, and “judging how blameless she is”).
229 Most jurisdictions still retain a force requirement in addition to proving the
victim’s nonconsent, therefore making it difficult for prosecutors to bring rape charges
under general rape laws. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 15. In some jurisdictions,
prosecutors may charge defendant with the lesser offense of nonconsensual sexual
contact, which does not contain a force requirement, but this crime is typically
criminalized at the level of a misdemeanor rather than as rape and therefore fails to
capture the severity of the conduct. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-404 (West
2013) (prohibiting unlawful sexual contact); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341 subdiv. 11 (West
2013) (prohibiting nonconsensual sexual contact).
230 David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 372 &
n.209 (2000).
231 Karen M. Kramer, Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing
Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115 (1994) (noting that “if the
victim was drunk, it increases her culpability” in the eyes of the jury).
232 See, e.g., Emily Finch & Vanessa E. Munro, Juror Stereotypes and Blame
Attribution in Rape Cases Involving Intoxicants, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 25 (2005); see
also Benedet, supra note 228; Chambers Goodman, supra note 86, at 88–89;
Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 27–30.
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differently when intoxication was voluntary; in cases of
involuntary intoxication, impaired judgment suffices to render
the complainant incapable of consent.233 But in cases of
voluntary intoxication, courts are not willing to be so generous
and have been reluctant to apply a threshold other than near
unconsciousness. Furthermore, courts are influenced by the
“fault” of the complainant and, at some level, judge how blameless
she is.234 Making victims’ incapacitation the cornerstone of the
crime involves various considerations that implicitly incorporate
judges’ and juries’ subjective moral and normative judgments
about voluntarily intoxicated victims, including their own
responsibility and contribution to the sexual act.
The North Carolina case of State v. Haddock illustrates
one example where normative judgments shape not only the
judge’s rhetoric but also the decision.235 The evidence in this
case established that the defendant engaged in sexual
intercourse with an extremely intoxicated victim who passed
out and fell asleep on defendant’s bed.236 The court strictly
construed the mental incapacitation prong of the rape statute,
holding that the words “due to an act committed upon the
victim,” in reference to the victim’s intoxicated state, connote
an action done by someone other than the victim and do not
include a voluntary act by the victim herself.237 Refusing to
adopt the state’s reading to also include the victim’s own acts,
the court “conclude[d] that the protection of the statute does
not serve to negate the consent of a person who voluntarily and
as a result of her own actions becomes intoxicated to a level
short of unconsciousness.”238 This result is not only deeply
disconcerting but also infused with moralistic judgment.
This article has so far identified one key source for the
difficulties surrounding the prosecutions of sexual assault of
voluntarily intoxicated victims. It demonstrated that the
application of the ITCS results in ample problems that mainly
leave intoxicated victims of sexual assault underprotected by
existing sexual assault laws, but its ambiguous and uncertain
nature also creates a potential risk of overbroad enforcement
for some defendants. The following parts move to consider
proposals that are aimed at ameliorating the drawbacks in
existing laws, beginning in Part IV with the American Law
233
234
235
236
237
238

See Falk, supra note 20, at 187–88.
See id.
664 S.E.2d 339 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 341.
Id. at 341, 345–47.
Id. at 346–47.
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Institute’s project and its shortcomings and moving in Part V
to propose an alternative framework.
IV.

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PROJECT AND ITS
DRAWBACKS

A consensus exists that the Model Penal Code’s (MPC or
the Code) dated sexual assault provisions fail to capture the
contemporary understanding that the essence of the crime of
rape is sex without consent and that these provisions should be
amended to reflect current sexual norms and evolving societal
perceptions about sexual practices.239 The American Law
Institute’s (ALI) ongoing project titled Sexual Assault and Related
Offenses, commenced in 2012, aims to offer a comprehensive
overhaul of the Code’s outmoded rape provisions including,
among others, the provision against sexual assault of an
intoxicated person.240 The definitions of the proposed offenses
are deeply contested among ALI members, however, and there
is tremendous controversy concerning the proper legal norms
that govern intimate sexual relations.241 This profound
disagreement is reflected in the fact that over the past years,
ALI members have considered multiple drafts, authored by the
project’s reporters, and to date, have failed to reach an agreed
upon position.242 Importantly, while ALI members have not yet
239 See generally Tuerkheimer, supra note 101, at 1475–78 (discussing the way
sexual consent has become the touchstone of the antirape movement). For existing
MPC provisions, see MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
§ 213.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft & Revised Comments, 1980) (prohibiting the
following: “A person who has sexual contact with another not his spouse, or causes such
other to have sexual contact with him, is guilty of sexual assault, a misdemeanor,
if: . . . he has substantially impaired the other person’s power to appraise or control his
or her conduct, by administering or employing without the other’s knowledge drugs,
intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance,” id. § 213.4(5)).
240 For publicly available drafts authored by the American Law Institute, see
MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2014); MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (AM.
LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015); MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND
RELATED OFFENSES (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015); MODEL PENAL CODE:
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016);
MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017). Publicly available drafts are available at https://www.ali.org/
projects/show/sexual-assault-and-related-offenses/. MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT
AND RELATED OFFENSES (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015) is available on
HeinOnline at http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.ali/mpc2276&div=1&
src=home.
241 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES reporters’
memorandum, at 15 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (noting that the treatment
of consent and associated offenses in earlier drafts “provoked great controversy” at ALI
meetings).
242 Professors Stephen Schulhofer and Erin Murphy are the project’s
reporters. See supra note 240 for the publicly available drafts.
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voted on any draft in its entirety, they have voted and
approved a proposed definition of consent, which will be
addressed below.
Before turning to examine the ALI’s proposed revisions,
a few critical clarifications are warranted. First, the ALI’s
project is still underway and maintains its ongoing status as
this article goes to press. Second, while only five drafts are
publicly available to date, other drafts have been circulated
among ALI members, yet these are not available to the public
and, therefore, cannot be addressed here.243 Third, the project’s
multiple drafts proposed different standards for evaluating the
victim’s level of incapacitation for the purpose of the prohibition
against sexual assault of intoxicated victims, making any
discussion of these provisions tentative and incomplete. The
most recent draft, however, dated April, 2017, does not address
the specific provision prohibiting Rape or Sexual Assault of a
Vulnerable Person.244 Given these limitations, the following
discussion focuses mainly on Preliminary Draft 5 and
Tentative Draft 3, except when referring to features common to
all drafts (MPC drafts).245
A.

Key Features of the MPC Drafts

A main point of controversy among ALI members was
what should the standard to determine consent to sex be: an
explicit manifestation of refusal, either physically or verbally
(expression of the word “no”), or instead, an affirmative consent
to engage in a sexual act. The disagreement was further
compounded given the fact that affirmative consent formulations
significantly vary, ranging from requiring a person seeking
intercourse to stop and explicitly ask permission to a specific
sexual act, to demanding clear agreement specific to, and
contemporaneous with, a particular sexual act, with some

See supra note 240.
Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017) (stating that Section 213.2 is “Reserved”).
245 The most recent ALI Annual Meeting took place on May 22–24, 2017,
resulting in the publication of Tentative Draft 3, which is now publicly available, see
supra note 240 and accompanying text. The ALI’s provisions discussed in this article
are all tentative as the project will continue after this article goes to press. Since the
most recent draft does not address the Rape and Sexual Assault of a Vulnerable Person
provision, this article discusses previous proposals, mostly Preliminary Draft 5, that do
address the specific provision regarding intoxicated victims.
243
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formulations going as far as demanding that permission must be
specific to every stage of the sexual proceeding.246
The MPC’s earlier drafts purported to propose some
formulation of an affirmative consent standard as the
governing standard for the proposed sexual offenses.247 ALI
members have mostly rejected this standard, however, expressing
concern that it fails to reflect common sexual practices, therefore
increasing the risk that innocent actors would be convicted.248 In
May 2016, ALI members approved an amended definition of
consent, providing in pertinent part the following:
Section 213.0. Definitions
(3) “Consent”
(a) “Consent” . . . means a person’s willingness to engage in a specific
act of sexual penetration or sexual contact.
(b) Consent may be expressed or it may be inferred from behavior—
both action and inaction—in the context of all the circumstances.
(c) Neither verbal nor physical resistance is required to establish
that consent is lacking, but their absence may be considered, in the
context of all the circumstances, in determining there was consent.
(d) Notwithstanding subsection (3)(b) of this Section, consent is
ineffective when it occurs in circumstances described in Sections
[reserved].
(e) Consent may be revoked or withdrawn any time before or during
the act of sexual penetration or sexual contact. A clear verbal
refusal—such as “No,” “Stop,” or “Don’t”—establishes the lack of
consent or the revocation or withdrawal of previous consent. Lack of

246 See Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 431–40 (2016)
(elaborating on the various formulations advocated by criminal statutes, scholars, and
universities).
247 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.2,
at 60–61 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014) (The proposed provision against
Sexual Intercourse Without Consent imposes criminal liability “whenever an actor has
sexual intercourse with a person who has not given affirmative consent.” Such provision
is premised on the assumption that the law should not treat ambiguous behavior,
including silence and passivity as equivalent to consent, whether or not the
complainant is intoxicated or not.).
248 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (proposing a new standard titled “contextual
consent,” under which consent is assessed under the totality of the circumstances); see
also id. reporters memorandum, at 16 (noting that the recommendation to adopt the
affirmative consent standard generated controversy among ALI members who worried
that the innocent would be convicted).
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consent or revocation or withdrawal of consent may be overridden by
subsequent consent.249

The above definition adopts what the ALI Reporters call
“contextual consent.”250 The contextual consent standard,
sometimes referred to as “expressive consent,” requires behavioral
or verbal manifestation of willingness to engage in sexual
intercourse.251 Under this standard, when a person verbally
refuses a sexual act, nonconsent is presumed regardless of the
overall context. However, this standard acknowledges that many
types of external manifestations can, in certain contexts, amount
to evidence of giving consent.252 Importantly, “silence and
passivity [may] sometimes communicate consent.”253 The latter
feature makes the contextual consent standard markedly
different from all formulations of affirmative consent; while the
affirmative consent standard insists on explicit expressions of
positive permission to engage in a sexual act, the contextual
consent standard concedes that even a complainant’s lack of
any indication of a positive response to the actor’s sexual
advances may, in certain contexts, manifest such permission.
Regarding the substantive sexual assault prohibitions,
the MPC drafts generally adopt a grading structure that
distinguishes between Forcible Rape, a felony in the first or
second degree, depending on the presence of aggravating
circumstances, the offense of Sexual Penetration of a Vulnerable
Person, a felony in the third degree, and the offense of Sexual
Penetration or Oral Sex Without Consent, a felony in the fourth
degree if the act occurs in disregard of the other person’s
expressed unwillingness, or is so sudden or unexpected that the
other person has no adequate opportunity to express
unwillingness before the act occurs, and a felony of the fifth
degree if these circumstances are not present.254

249 See Updated “Consent” Definition, AM. LAW INST. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.
ali.org/news/articles/updated-consent-definition/ [https://perma.cc/825F-MD64] (providing
the definition of consent as approved by ALI members).
250 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Consent: What It Means and Why It’s Time to
Require It, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 665, 669 (2016) (noting that under the expressive consent
standard, consent may be explicit or it may be inferred from the totality of circumstances).
In this article, I use the phrases “consent definition” and “contextual consent standard”
interchangeably.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 See Gruber, supra note 246, at 437–38 (distinguishing contextual consent
formulations from affirmative consent ones and stressing that under the ALI proposal,
silence and passivity can sometimes communicate consent).
254 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.1
and § 213.4 app. A, at 49–50 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017).
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The offense of Sexual Penetration or Oral Sex Without
Consent, Section 213.4 provides:
An actor is guilty of Sexual Penetration or Oral Sex Without Consent
if he or she knowingly or recklessly engages in an act of sexual
penetration or oral sex without the consent of the other person.255

The offense of Sexual Penetration of a Vulnerable
Person, Section 213.3 (2) (c) provides:
An actor is guilty of Sexual Penetration of a Vulnerable Person if he
or she engages in an act of sexual penetration, and knows or
recklessly disregards that the other person, at the time of such act:
(c) is passing in and out of consciousness or is in a state of mental
torpor as a result of intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary
and regardless of the identity of the person who administered the
intoxicants.256

The discussion below mainly focuses on the separate
prohibition of sexual assault of a vulnerable person. Addressing
the proposed general prohibition against Sexual Penetration or
Oral Sex Without Consent in its entirety raises various issues,
some of them exceeding the scope of this article. Therefore, it
addresses this provision only to the extent pertinent to
prosecuting sexual assault of intoxicated victims in situations
that are not covered by the separate provision against sexual
penetration of a vulnerable person. Specifically, it focuses on the
drawbacks of applying the contextual consent standard in cases
involving nonconsensual penetration of an intoxicated victim.
B.

Strengths of the MPC Drafts

In general, the ALI project is a laudable endeavor to
offer comprehensive treatment to the numerous complexities
underlying sexual offenses. In particular, the MPC drafts’
specific provision prohibiting sexual assault of intoxicated
persons carries some important advantages compared to existing
statutes. Its main strength lies in acknowledging that sexual
assault of intoxicated victims warrants a separate criminal
provision; the Sexual Penetration of a Vulnerable Person
provision equally applies where the victim rendered himself or
herself impaired after voluntarily consuming an excessive amount
of intoxicants.257 This position clearly departs from the Code’s
Id. § 213.4, at 50.
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3
(2), at 74 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015).
257 Id.
255

256
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existing prohibition, which criminalizes only the sexual assault
of involuntarily intoxicated victims, leaving voluntarily
intoxicated victims outside the scope of protection.258 For example,
the Blevins case, discussed in Part II infra, demonstrates the
shortcomings of a statutory scheme that is modeled after the
existing MPC prohibition.259
Recognizing that voluntarily intoxicated victims deserve
the law’s protection sends an important message that
individuals do not waive their right to bodily autonomy merely
because they chose to render themselves impaired. By adopting
a position that unequivocally proclaims that the decision to
become intoxicated should not be equated with consent to sex,
the MPC’s drafts contribute to dispelling a prevalent societal
misconception that by becoming voluntarily intoxicated,
individuals place themselves in a perpetual state of willingness
to engage in sex, thus waiving their rights to the law’s
protection against sexual violation.260
Furthermore, the MPC drafts’ grading framework aptly
recognizes that sexual assault of an impaired complainant due to
intoxication is a more serious form of sex offense than
nonconsensual sex alone because the defendant’s taking advantage
of an intoxicated victim’s vulnerability is an aggravating factor.
The MPC drafts embrace the position that this more egregious
behavior should be punished more severely and graded at a
higher level compared to the general offense of sexual penetration
without consent.
In addition, the MPC drafts aim at punishing only
culpable defendants, predicating liability on the defendant’s
recklessness as the necessary mens rea. Specifically, to convict
the defendant, the prosecution would have to prove that he or
she was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
complainant did not consent to sexual intercourse and
consciously disregarded that risk.261 Requiring recklessness as
the mens rea necessary for conviction therefore addresses
concerns about unfairness to defendants by requiring proof
that the defendant was consciously aware of the complainant’s
incapacity to express consent.
258

213.4(5)).

See supra note 239 (providing the MPC’s current prohibition under Section

See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra Section I.C (discussing prevalent misconceptions about sex
and alcohol).
261 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.4,
cmt., illus. 8–9, at 36–37, § 213.3, at 24 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017)
(stating that the required mens rea under the proposed sexual assault provisions is
recklessness).
259
260
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Drawbacks of the MPC Drafts

To reiterate an earlier point, the ALI reporters’
extensive work carefully crafting nuanced provisions is
praiseworthy. Without diminishing the MPC drafts’
contribution to protecting voluntarily intoxicated victims, they
suffer from several shortcomings.
To begin with, the Sexual Penetration of a Vulnerable
Person provision, requiring either passing in and out of
consciousness or a state of mental torpor, adopts a restrictive
standard for evaluating a victim’s impairing intoxication. While
the consciousness language provides some clarity because it
rests on a bright-line rule, its main shortcoming lies in its
narrow purview. By limiting the scope of the complainant’s
impairing intoxication to cover only cases rising to the level of
complete incapacitation, the prohibition sets a notably high bar
for evaluating a victim’s impaired ability to communicate
nonconsent.262 It rejects all other observable signs of significantly
impairing intoxication that fall short of complete incapacitation
as sufficient for the offense of sexual penetration of a vulnerable
person. There may be situations where the complainant is
conscious and is not in a state of torpor but is nonetheless
sufficiently impaired that he or she is unable to communicate
nonconsent, for example, when the complainant is vomiting,
moaning, and curling into a ball but not passing out.263 Making
complete incapacity a precondition for applying the Sexual
Assault of a Vulnerable Person prohibition is inadequate because
it is bound to raise some of the same problems that characterize
existing incapacity-to-consent standards, particularly those
concerning underinclusiveness.264
In fact, the proposed framework may prove even
narrower than existing definitions of incapacitation used in many
jurisdictions today, under which incapacity due to intoxication
also extends to reach impaired conditions that do not amount to
absolute unconsciousness.265 In a series of decisions, courts have
262 See Aya Gruber, Not Affirmative Consent, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 683, 698
(2016) (noting that Professor Schulhofer, the ALI reporter, implies that the proposed
standard might be underinclusive, envisioning “situations ‘where the complainant is
conscious and not in a state of torpor, but is nonetheless intoxicated enough that s/he
does not or cannot meaningfully’ agree to sex, for example, when the complainant is
vomiting, moaning and curling into a ball, but not passing out”).
263 Id. (addressing Professor Schulhofer’s concern that there are additional
situations in which a complainant is unable to communicate nonconsent beyond
unconsciousness).
264 See supra Part III.
265 The ALI reporters explain in the Commentary that the proposal offers
“bright-line” rules. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
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clarified that the term “incapacitation” covers not only complete
unconsciousness but also situations where a victim’s mental
condition was so impaired that it prevented him or her from
verbally communicating refusal to sexual intercourse.266
In addition, the use of the mental torpor language raises
special concerns.267 The ALI reporters explain the standard in
the commentary by reference to dictionary definitions, such as:
“[a]bsence or suspension of motive power, activity or feeling,” “a
state of mental and motor inactivity with partial or total
insensibility,”268 and “a state of lowered physiological
activity.”269 The reporters add that the term “mental torpor”
also corresponds to the level of intoxication that some refer to
as “stupor,” in which a person loses significant response time,
has trouble moving, vomits, and may lapse in and out of
consciousness.270 The reporters explain that these conditions
are meant to capture an extreme point of intoxication at which
consent becomes highly unlikely, and at which any passivity or
nonresponsiveness on the part of the other person should
presumptively be deemed due to intoxicants, rather than a
signal of consent. Put differently, the inquiry focuses on
whether the degree of intoxication was so extreme as to
effectively preclude the expression of unwillingness.271
The problem with the “mental torpor” test is that it
rests on an extremely vague notion whose precise meaning is
unclear to the layperson. On one hand, this type of uncertainty
raises a risk that potential defendants would have difficulties
determining whether the complainant’s intoxication met that
§ 213.3, cmt. 4, at 83–85 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015) (discussing
mental torpor and loss of consciousness rules).
266 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blache, 880 N.E.2d 736, 742–43 (Mass. 2008)
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that the complainant should be considered incapable
of consenting only when she was rendered unconscious or nearly so and holding that a
jury instruction concerning capacity to consent should be given in cases where, because
of the consumption of alcohol, the complainant was so impaired as to be incapable of
consenting to intercourse); People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 321–22 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (rejecting the view that incapacitation requires “absolute unconsciousness”).
267 See Gruber, supra note 262, at 698 (positing that MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3, cmt. 4, at 85 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft
No. 5, 2015) defines a state of “torpor,” as “laps[ing] in and out of consciousness”).
268 Torpor, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
203613?redirectedFrom=torpor#eid [https://perma.cc/J9E5-HBKB].
269 Torpor, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
torpor?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld [https://perma.cc/L
DB7-V64C].
270 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3,
cmt. 4, at 85 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015).
271 See Kevin Cole, Sex and the Single Malt Girl: How Voluntary Intoxication
Affects Consent, 78 MONT. L. REV. 155, 179–81 (2017) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015)).
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level. On the other hand, the proposed language also fails to
protect victims whose level of intoxication was sufficiently severe
to significantly impair their ability to communicate nonconsent,
yet did not amount to the total loss of consciousness or lapsing in
and out of consciousness. The proposed “mental torpor” test is
therefore likely to result in similar drawbacks that characterize
the ITCS; it is similarly underinclusive—providing too narrow a
standard to evaluate the victim’s level of impairment.272
Another drawback of the MPC drafts concerns the
relationship between the separate prohibition on Sexual
Penetration of a Vulnerable Person and the general prohibition
against Sexual Penetration or Oral Sex Without Consent. The
drafts provide a differentiated treatment to impaired victims
due to intoxication, depending on the victim’s level of
intoxication. The Sexual Penetration of a Vulnerable Person
prohibition, meant to specifically address the sexual assault of
intoxicated victims, only covers the most extreme forms of
intoxication, in which the victim was either passing in and out
of consciousness or was in a state of mental torpor as a result of
intoxication.273 In contrast, Sexual Penetration or Oral Sex
Without Consent is a general prohibition that does not target
sexual assault of intoxicated victims but may nonetheless be
used to prosecute cases where the victim’s impairment was
insufficient to amount to total incapacitation.274
This differentiated treatment of sexual assault of
impaired victims due to intoxication is unwarranted because it
might leave severely impaired victims underprotected in
situations where their condition is not deemed sufficiently
incapacitating. The problem is exemplified in a scenario used in
the commentary accompanying the proposed Sexual Penetration
or Oral Sex Without Consent prohibition. Notably, the
commentary explicitly concedes that the separate prohibition
against Sexual Penetration of a Vulnerable Person only applies
when the complainant was legally incapacitated.275 Attempting to
address cases that fall outside the scope of the separate
prohibition because the complainant’s intoxication did not
satisfy the loss of consciousness and mental torpor standard, the
See supra Section III.B.2.b (discussing the drawbacks in the ITCS).
Id.
274 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.4,
illus. 9, at 36–37 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017) (providing commentary to
the sexual penetration or oral sex without consent provision and giving an example
involving an intoxicated complainant).
275 Id. at 37 (noting that in cases like illustration 9, in which the complainant’s
intoxication is insufficient to trigger liability under Section 213.2, actors may be
prosecuted under the Sexual Penetration or Oral Sex Without Consent provision).
272

273
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Commentary stresses that cases where the complainant’s level
of intoxication fell short of complete incapacitation may still be
prosecuted under the general offense of Sexual Penetration or
Oral Sex Without Consent.276 In one specific illustration
discussed in the commentary to MPC Tentative Draft 3, the
accused and the complainant meet each other for the first time
at a party. Over several hours they flirt while drinking heavily.
Late at night, the complainant steps away from the accused and
nearly falls to the floor from inebriation. Accused helps
complainant lie in a back room. Complainant babbles incoherently,
and throws up but does not lose consciousness. Accused removes
complainant’s boxer shorts and engages in an act of penetration.
The Commentary explains that even though there is no evidence
that the complainant physically or verbally resisted or that he or
she was so incapacitated as to trigger liability under the Sexual
Penetration of a Vulnerable Person Provision, that testimony is
legally sufficient to support finding that Complainant did not
consent, if the trier of fact credits complainant’s testimony that he
or she was not willing at the time.277
The proposed solution is unsatisfactory for several
reasons. First, the normative basis for the differentiated
treatment of cases involving complainant’s total incapacitation
and those involving significant impairment in physical and
mental capabilities remains obscure. Despite acknowledging in
the above illustration, that the complainant’s impairment due
to intoxication was substantial, MPC Tentative Draft 3 posits
that this case would not be covered by the specific prohibition
against sexual assault of intoxicated victims because the
impairment had not reached the requisite level of legal
incapacitation, namely, unconsciousness or mental torpor.278 A
statutory framework that distinguishes between intoxicated
victims of sexual assault based on whether they were
completely incapacitated or significantly impaired to the extent
that they were unable to communicate opposition is arbitrary
and unjustified. It might leave underprotected significantly
impaired victims whose intoxication fell short of what the
proposal deems sufficiently incapacitating intoxication.279 It is
not apparent why a defendant who takes advantage of a victim
whose level of intoxication fell short of unconsciousness yet was
276 See id. at 11–12 (discussing the sexual assault of an intoxicated complainant
whose level of intoxication did not reach incapacitation).
277 See id.
278 Id. (noting that this case might still be prosecuted under the general
provision prohibiting sexual penetration or oral sex without consent).
279 See Gruber, supra note 262.
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sufficiently severe to impair his or her ability to communicate
nonconsent is less culpable than one who takes advantage of an
unconscious victim to impose nonconsensual sex.
Second, falling back on the alternative route to
prosecution rather than directly using the specialized intoxication
provision is prone to be especially problematic in cases involving
heavily intoxicated victims because it rests on the contextual
consent standard. A key problem in relying on this standard to
prohibit the sexual assault of severely impaired victims is that
its application may leave some significantly impaired victims
beyond the scope of the law’s protection. This standard is
especially problematic in cases involving intoxicated victims
given two features embodied in the amended definition of
consent: the idea that consent may be inferred not only from
action but also from inactivity, and that lack of physical or verbal
resistance may be considered in context of all the circumstances
in determining whether the person has consented.280
The above features capture the key difference between
the affirmative consent and the contextual consent standards:
the former explicitly rejects passivity, inaction, and silence as
expression of consent, whereas the latter leaves room for
considering silence and passivity, in certain circumstances, in
evaluating whether a complainant’s conduct communicates
consent.281 The MPC’s contextual consent standard under
which consent to sex may, in some circumstances, be inferred
from a person’s passivity, silence, and inactiveness is
untenable. First, it runs counter to one of the most
fundamental arguments rape law reformers make, that
passivity and unresponsiveness to a sexual act should never be
construed as an expression of consent.282 This definition of
consent rejects the affirmative consent standard as the test for
determining whether consent had been given.283 Second,
inferring consent from a person’s inactivity is especially
indefensible when it concerns intoxicated individuals since a
280 See Schulhofer, supra note 250, at 669; see also supra note 248 (providing
the newly adopted Section § 213.0(3) (Consent), under which consent may also be
inferred from passivity and inaction under certain circumstances).
281 See Schulhofer, supra note 250, at 669 (stressing that “while silence and
passivity cannot by themselves be treated as consent, they are forms of conduct, and all
of a person’s conduct should be taken into account”).
282 See generally Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda
for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 484–85 (2005)
(noting that it is “crucial that silence be eliminated as an indicator of consent”).
283 See Gruber, supra note 262, at 699–700 (positing that the MPC draft does
not “fill a passivity-silence gap when it allows omissions, in context, to count as consent”
and that the “expressive consent standard does not resolve difficulties in interpreting
passivity and silence”).
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much greater possibility exists that the lack of opposition stems
from the victim’s impairment rather than from actual
willingness. These victims are unresponsive precisely due to
their severe intoxication, which significantly impairs their
ability to communicate nonconsent.284 By retaining the prospect
that the utter passivity of a significantly intoxicated person may
still be viewed as an expression of consent, the proposal
perpetuates current laws’ problematic commitment to the idea
that mere acquiescence equals consent.
To be clear, certainly the intent of the ALI reporters is
to expand the scope of criminal liability by covering situations
where the victim was not completely unconscious yet sufficiently
impaired to render him or her unable to give consent.285 The
contextual consent standard calls for a fact-bound inquiry, which
depends on the totality of the circumstances, allowing the jury to
conclude that when a complainant was significantly impaired
due to intoxication, his or her passivity may not qualify as an
expression of consent. Yet, allowing the jury to infer consent
from passivity casts doubts on whether the ALI’s intent could,
in fact, be fully attained. A standard permitting an inference of
consent even from utter passivity should be viewed with
skepticism because it creates the risk that a jury might
wrongly conclude that a significantly impaired victim who did
not overtly communicate nonconsent was nonetheless consenting.
Finally, grounding criminalization of sexual assault of
significantly impaired yet still conscious victims on the general
Sexual Penetration or Oral Sex Without Consent provision fails
to capture the severity of the defendant’s behavior and
culpability. Engaging in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a
complainant whose ability to communicate nonconsent was
significantly impaired due to intoxication should be an
aggravating circumstance that elevates the severity of engaging
in sexual intercourse without consent with a sober complainant.
The general prohibition of Sexual Penetration or Oral Sex
Without Consent does not specifically address the distinct
features and unique harm characterizing consciously engaging in
nonconsensual intercourse with significantly impaired victims.
284 See generally Tuerkheimer, supra note 96, at 457 (noting that “[w]here
intoxication does not render a complainant unconscious, but nevertheless results in
significant impairment,” unresponsiveness may not count as consent under the affirmative
consent standard).
285 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3,
cmt. 4, at 83 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015) (noting that “some safeguard
is imperative for victims who are too sober to lose consciousness but too intoxicated to
communicate” nonconsent).
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In sum, the MPC drafts’ separate prohibition designed
to target sexual assault of intoxicated victims covers only the
most severe situations involving mainly complete incapacitation,
either total loss of consciousness, or coming close to this
condition, potentially leaving victims whose impairment fell
short of that high threshold underprotected. In turn, the general
prohibition on Sexual Penetration or Oral Sex Without Consent
is unable to adequately supplement it because it does not
capture the distinct features characterizing significantly
impaired victims. The MPC drafts therefore offer only a partial
solution to the problems this article has identified in previous
parts. The following part proposes a statute that would prohibit
sexual assault not only in cases where complainants’ level of
intoxication rendered them completely incapacitated but also
when intoxication significantly impaired their ability to
communicate nonconsent.
V.

A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

The
previous
parts
addressed
the
problems
characterizing both existing statutes against sexual assault of
voluntarily intoxicated victims and the MPC drafts for reforming
these statutes. The main challenge for any legal reform in this
area is to draft sufficiently broad prohibitions to protect
voluntarily intoxicated victims from nonconsensual sex on the
one hand, but to preclude criminal liability in cases falling short
of defendants’ culpable conduct on the other. The following
sections first delve into the reasons for imposing criminal
liability in cases involving voluntary intoxication. Next, the
article offers an alternative framework that would replace
existing standards with a test that provides that consent cannot
be expressed when a victim’s communication abilities are
significantly impaired.
A.

Justifications for Criminalizing Voluntarily Intoxicated
Sex

Any proposal to expand the scope of criminal prohibitions
on sexual assault of voluntarily intoxicated victims must first
consider whether such amendment is justified from a normative
standpoint. For some people, proposals like this are met with
deep skepticism, mostly stemming from the misconceptions
discussed earlier, particularly the assumption that individuals
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who became voluntarily intoxicated assume the risks that result
from their free choice to become intoxicated.286
A societal debate about the justifications for placing
criminal blame, especially when both the perpetrator and the
victim were voluntarily intoxicated, began in the early 1990s, in
response to media reports suggesting that there was an
“epidemic,” mainly in colleges, of what was dubbed the “date rape
crisis.”287 Journalist Robin Warshaw, for example, argued that
while intoxicated women are responsible for the consequences of
their actions if they cause harm to others, they are not
responsible for being raped or “deserve” to be raped just because
they became voluntarily intoxicated.288
The controversy was fueled by Katie Roiphe’s book,
suggesting that in many sexual assault cases alleged victims
are at least partially responsible for voluntarily becoming
drunk.289 Roiphe contended that agency principles demand that
women be responsible for their own intake of intoxicants, and if
they had sex while their judgment was impaired, it is neither
always the man’s fault nor is it necessarily rape.290 This
provocative position elicited mostly condemnation from critics
who worried that making sexual assault victims partially
responsible for crimes perpetrated against them jeopardized
feminists’ efforts to eliminate gender-based violence.291
A recent increase in sexual misconduct allegations has
reignited the debate over the proper legal response to sexual
acts committed against voluntarily intoxicated individuals.292
See supra Section I.C.
See Kathryn Abrams, Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance
Feminism in the University, 103 YALE. L.J. 1533, 1534 (1994) (reviewing KATIE ROIPHE,
THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993)).
288 See ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON
RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, at xxiv, 22,
44 (2d ed. 1994).
289 See ROIPHE, supra note 287, at 53–54.
290 Id. (noting that women should be responsible for their decisions when they
choose to consume alcohol and they can have sex when they are intoxicated without
that act constituting rape).
291 See, e.g., Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, Books of the Times: Divergent Views of
Rape as Violence and Sex, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/16/
books/books-of-the-times-divergent-views-of-rape-as-violence-and-sex.html [https://perma.cc/
7L7E-LCNQ]; Katha Pollitt, Not Just Bad Sex, NEW YORKER, Oct. 4, 1993, at 220–24.
292 See Yoffe, supra note 41 (suggesting that girls should be warned that
heavy drinking increases their vulnerability to sexual violence); see also Amanda Hess,
To Prevent Rape on College Campuses, Focus on the Rapists, Not the Victims, SLATE
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/10/16/it_s_the_rapists_not_the_
drinking_to_prevent_sexual_assault_on_college_campuses.html [https://perma.cc/2LVNV3VY] (rejecting Yoffe’s position that focuses on educating women not to drink by positing
that it is a counter-productive approach and arguing that most campus rapes can be
prevented by endeavoring to find and punish perpetrators rather than warning potential
victims to skip out on drinking).
286
287
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For example, Wall Street Journal editor James Taranto argued
in a 2014 editorial that intoxicated females are at least partially
responsible for intoxicated sexual encounters, contending that
when both parties are voluntarily intoxicated, females should be
equally responsible for raping intoxicated males.293
Why, then, should the law impose criminal sanctions in
cases where people willingly chose to become intoxicated,
consciously diminishing their abilities to protect themselves
against harm? This question becomes especially poignant when
both parties are intoxicated, raising the contentious issue of
whether the law should allocate between them the
responsibility for ensuing harm.
From a normative perspective, imposing criminal
liability for sexually assaulting voluntarily intoxicated victims
is both legally and morally justified. A number of policy reasons
support the argument that the law should not make liability
dependent on whether the victim’s intoxication was voluntary or
not. Succinctly put, people do not deserve less legal protection
just because they willingly became temporarily impaired.
First, the harm principle provides a paramount
justification for criminalizing nonconsensual sex with voluntarily
intoxicated victims, including cases where both parties were
intoxicated.294 Causing harm to others has long served as the
primary justification for criminalization, and this principle
retains its force when it comes to sexual assault of voluntarily
intoxicated victims.295 When both parties are intoxicated, a critical
difference sets them apart: the perpetrator imposes
nonconsensual sex on the victim; the victim suffers significant
injury as a direct result of the perpetrator’s culpable actions.
While sexual assault causes serious mental and psychological
harm to victims, discussion of its full extent exceeds the scope of
this article.296 Suffice it to say, that while every adult has an
autonomous right to become intoxicated, this freedom is limited,
ending at the moment he or she injures another. While people
293 See James Taranto, Drunkenness and Double Standards, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
10, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304558804579374844067975558
(“[W]hen two drunken college students ‘collide,’ the male one is almost always presumed to
be at fault. His diminished capacity owing to alcohol is not a mitigating factor, but her
diminished capacity is an aggravating factor for him.”).
294 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George
Kateb eds., 2003) (1859) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”).
295 See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 109, 131 (1999) (discussing the role of the harm principle as justifying
criminal sanctions).
296 See generally ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 102–18
(2003) (providing an elaborate discussion of the ample harms of nonconsensual sex).
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may engage in behaviors that harm themselves, no one has a
right to cause harm to others. From a normative standpoint,
prohibiting intoxicated perpetrators from harming others is
more justified than holding intoxicated victims responsible for
what perpetrators did to them.297
Second, criminalizing the sexual assault of voluntarily
intoxicated victims is justified because the sex at issue is
nonconsensual. The key inquiry underlying sexual assault cases
where intoxication is not a factor is whether sex was consensual
or not. This inquiry should not change in cases involving sexual
assault of intoxicated victims, whether intoxication was voluntary
or not. The distinct feature characterizing the latter cases is that
the reason for the failure to express nonconsent rests with
significant impairment in communication abilities due to
intoxication. This feature does not depend on how the intoxication
came about. The voluntariness of the intoxication is simply
irrelevant for the purpose of considering whether sexual
intercourse was nonconsensual.
Third, an individual’s choice to become intoxicated should
not be equated with giving unlimited and perpetual consent to
all sexual acts perpetrated against this person. Such conflation
preserves the myth that an individual’s voluntary consumption
of intoxicants implies a cart blanche agreement to any harm
inflicted on him or her while intoxicated, including violation of the
right to sexual autonomy. An individual’s choice to expose oneself
to the potential harm that might ensue from becoming intoxicated
does not indicate consent to additional harm resulting from
nonconsensual sex.
Fourth, considering analogous situations in which victims’
preceding behavior somehow contributed to facilitating offenses
committed against them further supports the conclusion that
intoxicated victims should not lose the law’s protection for failure
to better protect their interests.298 Professor Alan Wertheimer
noted that in other areas of law outside the context of sex offenses,
such as theft crimes, victims’ partial responsibility for bringing
harm upon themselves is never at issue and victims are never
blamed even if their behavior appears to be somehow careless.299
297 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.2,
at 58 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
298 See generally JESSICA VALENTI, THE PURITY MYTH: HOW AMERICA’S
OBSESSION WITH VIRGINITY IS HURTING YOUNG WOMEN (2010) (noting that while
women should be treated as independent agents, being responsible has nothing to do
with being raped and that women do not get raped because they were not careful but
because someone raped them).
299 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 296, at 244–45.
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Lastly, engaging in sexual penetration with people whose
ability to communicate nonconsent was significantly impaired
due to intoxication exemplifies the exploitation of others by taking
advantage of their vulnerability. Focusing on perpetrators’
exploitative behavior encapsulates the essence of their culpable
conduct, therefore justifying the imposition of criminal sanctions.
Stressing the nature of the perpetrators’ behavior also explains
why their culpability does not depend on whether victims became
voluntarily or involuntarily intoxicated. Once a culpable
behavior is identified, the question of how the victim’s
intoxication came about is irrelevant because it has no bearing
on the perpetrator’s blameworthiness.
B.

Defining the Elements of the Crime

The sections below propose an alternative framework to
protect intoxicated individuals against sexual violation while
responding to the concerns stemming from existing standards.
The proposed statute aims to strike a balance between
safeguarding intoxicated people from nonconsensual sex while
avoiding overbroad criminal liability for nonculpable conduct. The
mechanism for accomplishing this dual goal rests on a trade-off
that expands the definition of the actus reus of the crime on the
one hand, but contracts the mens rea element by requiring proof
of the defendant’s conscious awareness of the victim’s significant
impairment in communication abilities on the other.
This article’s proposed Sexual Assault of an Intoxicated
Person provides:
An actor is guilty of sexual assault of an intoxicated person when he
or she recklessly engages in sexual penetration or oral sex by direct
contact of any body part or by any object, with a passive, silent, or
otherwise unresponsive person who has not consented to the act and
whose ability to communicate unwillingness was significantly
impaired due to intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary.
The offense is a felony in the third degree. The offense is aggravated
to a felony in the second degree if the actor administered the
intoxicants and did so without the person’s knowledge.300
300 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3,
at 3, 56 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015) (Section 213.3 (2) proposes an
offense of Sexual Penetration of a Vulnerable Person, proscribing the following: “An actor
is guilty of Sexual Penetration of a Vulnerable Person, a felony of the third degree, if he
or she knowingly or recklessly engages in an act of sexual penetration with a person who,
at the time of the act . . . (c) has not expressly refused to consent to such act, but is unable
to express by words or actions his or her refusal to engage in such act, because of
intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, and regardless of the identity of the
person who administered the intoxication.”). While the ALI Reporters proposed the
“inability to communicate unwillingness” standard in MPC Discussion Draft 2, they later
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While the statute applies equally to both voluntary and
involuntary intoxication, distinguishing between them is
accomplished by adopting a different grading structure that
punishes involuntary intoxication more harshly because
surreptitiously administering intoxicants to another aggravates
the severity of the offense.301
1. Actus Reus
To establish the actus reus of the crime, the prosecution
would have to prove that the sexual penetration or oral sex was
nonconsensual and that the victim’s ability to communicate
nonconsent was significantly impaired due to intoxication. The
proposal rests on two key features that capture the distinct
condition of extremely intoxicated persons: acknowledgment that
severely intoxicated persons’ passivity and unresponsiveness
cannot be treated as consent to sexual penetration or oral sex and
the notion of significant impairment in communication abilities.
As noted earlier, under the verbal refusal standard, which
is the predominant standard in the majority of jurisdictions for
determining whether the sexual act was nonconsensual, passivity,
silence, or any other form of unresponsive or ambiguous behavior
falling short of expressly opposing sexual intercourse, are
treated as consent.302 Applying this standard in cases involving
heavily intoxicated victims, albeit not completely incapacitated,
is untenable because when such person is not responding to
sexual advances, the reason for such passivity rests with his or
her impaired condition. While the passivity of a sober person
might be ambiguous, requiring further interpretation, there is no
such ambiguity when an intoxicated person is concerned because
the impaired condition precludes an expression of unwillingness.
The proposed statute explicitly rejects the possibility that passivity,
silence, and unresponsiveness of a significantly impaired person
would be treated as consent. Instead, it makes clear that the
inaction of such person is presumed to express nonconsent to
revised this standard due to concerns that it was too vague, opting instead for what they
defined as bright-line rule: the loss of consciousness and mental torpor standard, which is
adopted in MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3, at 85
(AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015) (explaining the advantage of adopting a
bright-line rule).
301 Addressing the sentencing aspects related to sexual assaults exceeds the
scope of this article. Suffice it to say that states’ sentencing schemes may also support
this grading structure by listing the surreptitious administration of intoxicants as a
sentencing enhancer.
302 See supra Section II.A; see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND
RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3, cmt. 4, at 83 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015)
(noting that under existing laws, passivity and unresponsiveness can be treated as consent).
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sexual penetration or oral sex, even when his or her condition
falls short of total loss of consciousness or nears such state.
In positing that an extremely intoxicated person’s
passivity will not be equated with consent, the proposed statute
does not take a position with respect to what ought to be the
general standard for evaluating the presence of consent in
contexts not involving intoxicated victims. Specifically, it leaves
open the question of whether an affirmative consent standard
should be adopted when impairing intoxication is not at issue,
including the applicable standard for the purpose of the general
prohibition against sexual penetration or oral sex without consent.
This article further concedes that many of the problems concerning
the standard to evaluate whether sexual penetration or oral sex
was nonconsensual theoretically could have been avoided had an
affirmative consent standard been uniformly adopted. Under an
affirmative consent standard, when complainants have not clearly
expressed consent (verbally or physically), the sexual act is
nonconsensual, “regardless of how much alcohol, if any, the
[complainant] ha[d] consumed.”303 Indeed, espousing a general
affirmative consent standard applicable to all sexual assault
prohibitions theoretically could have accomplished a similar
result to the one that this article advocates.
Yet, the proposed statute opts for carving out a separate
standard applicable only when significant impairment due to
intoxication is involved, without calling for generally embracing
an affirmative consent standard in all other contexts. A
specialized prohibition targeting the distinct features
characterizing the impaired condition of heavily intoxicated
victims offers a better solution to the problems identified in this
article, due to both practical and normative reasons. From a
practical standpoint, adopting the affirmative consent standard
is not currently feasible given the lack of consensus among legal
scholars about its desirability.304 Voluminous scholarship
thoroughly considers this standard, and fully examining it
exceeds the scope of this article.305 For the purposes of the
argument here, the possibility of all jurisdictions adopting this
standard at this time does not appear to be a viable one.306 As
303 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.2,
cmt. 5, at 61 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
304 See Kevin Cole, Better Sex Through Criminal Law: Proxy Crimes, Covert
Negligence, and Other Difficulties of “Affirmative Consent” in the ALI’s Draft Sexual Assault
Provisions, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 510, 576 (2016) (observing that the MPC draft
proposes an affirmative consent standard and rejecting it as an inappropriate standard).
305 For more thorough treatment of this standard, see Tuerkheimer, supra note 96.
306 See Judith Shulevitz, Regulating Sex, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/judith-shulevitz-regulating-sex.html?_r=0
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discussed earlier, the ALI has approved a contextual
understanding of consent, which not only rejects an affirmative
consent standard but also allows factfinders to infer consent
from passivity in certain circumstances.307 While in theory this
article does not reject affirmative consent as a proper standard
able to accomplish equitable resolutions in cases involving
sexual assault of intoxicated victims, the contentious dispute
over the appropriateness of this standard shows that the
proposed standard is currently a more attainable goal.
Additionally, from a normative standpoint, a separate
prohibition on nonconsensual sex with intoxicated victims
whose ability to express nonconsent was significantly impaired
is warranted because perpetrators in such cases are especially
morally blameworthy given the additional aggravating factor of
taking advantage of the victim’s special vulnerability.
Designating such separate prohibition properly differentiates
between offenders based on their specific level of culpability.
Another key feature embedded in the proposed statute
is proof that at the time of the sexual penetration the victim
was significantly impaired in the ability to communicate verbal
or physical opposition due to severe intoxication. In opting for a
“significant impairment in the ability to communicate” standard,
the proposal rejects a formulation that requires complete inability
to communicate unwillingness.308 The problem with the latter
standard is that it invites factfinder’s uncertainty and confusion
about whether a victim completely lacked any communication
abilities, rather than experienced substantial deterioration in the
ability to communicate nonconsent. A standard that requires total
loss of communication abilities is too limiting because it fails to
acknowledge that there might be situations in which victims
maintain some degree of communication ability, yet overall, their
ability to effectively communicate refusal is significantly

[https://perma.cc/WX4Q-7UPZ] (noting that more than 4000 law professors, judges, and
lawyers are thinking about the proper standard for consent to sex and are unable to reach
an agreement).
307 See supra note 249 and accompanying text (providing consent definition as
already approved by ALI members); see also Gruber, supra note 246, at 438 (noting
that the ALI “standard acknowledges that silence and passivity can sometimes
communicate consent”).
308 It should be noted that the ALI reporters once proposed an “inability to
express refusal” standard in their 2015 Discussion Draft 2, but later revised it,
substituting it with the loss of consciousness and mental torpor formulation, which
they believed provided a bright-line rule instead of vaguer standard. Compare MODEL
PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015), with MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND
RELATED OFFENSES § 213.1 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015).
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diminished.309 By incorporating the concept of “significant
impairment” in lieu of “complete inability,” the proposed statute
recognizes that communication abilities may be significantly
undermined without amounting to complete loss.
Additionally, the proposed statute opts for a fact-specific
standard for guiding the jury’s assessment of the victim’s
debilitating condition, rather than an inflexible, bright-line
rule.310 A “significant impairment in communication abilities”
inquiry offers a functional standard, allowing the jury to evaluate
the victim’s condition given the totality of the circumstances.
These evaluations mainly include evidence about the victim’s
visible signs of mental and physical impairment, such as vomiting
and inability to walk straight. The adoption of a “significant
impairment in communication abilities” standard is predicated on
acknowledgment that crafting bright-line rules to define the
victim’s precise level of intoxication may result in underprotecting
intoxicated victims because significant impairment in
communication abilities lies on a broad spectrum, extending over
and above definitive formulations such as loss of consciousness.311
2. Mens Rea
One of the goals of the proposed statute is to ensure that
criminal liability is imposed only on culpable defendants whose
behavior demonstrates moral wrongdoing.312 Redefining the
actus reus of the crime by requiring a significant impairment
in the complainant’s ability to communicate nonconsent is
merely the first step in the inquiry concerning whether the
sexual intercourse or oral sex amounts to criminal conduct. It
is the second step in that inquiry, namely, proving the
defendant’s mens rea, that does most of the important work of
identifying only culpable actors.
To accomplish this goal, the proposal requires proof of
the defendant’s actual recklessness because the main feature
distinguishing culpable from nonculpable actors is the conscious
awareness of the victim’s nonconsent. Demanding that the
309 See State v. Chaney, 5 P.3d 492, 498–99 (Kan. 2000) (noting that it is possible
that a victim is able to instinctively utter the word “no” yet be “psychologically and
physiologically impaired”).
310 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.3,
cmt. 4, at 84–85 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015) for an attempt to define
two bright-line rules for victim’s debilitating conditions: passing in and out of consciousness
and mental torpor. For critique of this position, see supra Section IV.C.
311 See supra Section III.B.2.b.
312 See generally MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW 193 (1997) (noting that culpability is both necessary and sufficient
as a basis for criminal punishment).
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prosecution prove the defendant’s recklessness ensures that
criminal liability is imposed only based on personal
blameworthiness, as opposed to mere negligence. In order to
hold defendants criminally liable for engaging in nonconsensual
intercourse or oral sex with intoxicated victims, a prosecutor
would have to prove that the defendant was subjectively aware
of the risk that the complainant’s ability to communicate
nonconsent was significantly impaired.
As mentioned earlier, a recurring problem characterizing
the prosecution of sexual assault where intoxication is at issue is
that often both victim and defendant are intoxicated, raising
concerns that the latter’s ability to evaluate risks are also
clouded by the effects of intoxicants.313 In these cases,
defendants typically claim that being heavily intoxicated at the
time of the sexual encounter had rendered them unaware that
their sexual partner did not consent to sex.314
The criminal law has traditionally rejected a
defendant’s voluntary intoxication as a defense to a crime.315
While some jurisdictions recognize intoxication as a defense to
specific intent crimes, or crimes requiring a mens rea of
knowledge or purpose, they mostly preclude it as a defense to a
general intent crime or to a crime requiring recklessness.316
Moreover, jurisdictions following the Model Penal Code’s
position adopt a specific provision, under which if an intoxicated
defendant was unaware of a risk of which he would have been
aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.317
Under such provisions, an intoxicated person’s awareness of a
risk is measured against the standard of a sober actor, resulting
in holding that person criminally responsible if he or she were
negligent with respect to the risk that a material element exists.
Additionally, many court decisions have held that self-induced

313 See supra Section V.A (discussing the scenario in which both parties are
intoxicated).
314 Commonwealth v. Mountry, 972 N.E.2d 438, 443 (Mass. 2012) (involving an
intoxicated defendant claiming that he was unaware of the victim’s state of intoxication).
315 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (2015) (providing that an intoxicated
person “is criminally responsible” and “an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any
offense”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 308 (2014) (providing that “[n]either voluntary intoxication
nor voluntary drugged condition is a defense to a criminal charge”).
316 See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 58 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
(holding that an intoxicated defendant who was unaware that the man he was assaulting
was a police officer was guilty of a crime requiring recklessness).
317 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.08(2), at 349 (AM. LAW
INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (providing that if a person “due to selfinduced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been
sober, such awareness is immaterial”).
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intoxication is considered in itself a reckless conduct.318 Given
common knowledge of the risks of heavy intoxication, when a
person consciously chooses to impair his or her powers of
perceptions, judgment, and control, that person is held to be aware
of the risk that he or she might inflict harm on other individuals.319
Scholars have criticized this position, arguing that
awareness of the risks of becoming intoxicated should not be
equated with conscious awareness of a risk that another crime
would be committed and inflict specific harm that the statute
prohibits.320 Furthermore, displacing actual awareness with
mere negligence deviates from modern criminal law’s general
culpability structure, which opts for recklessness as the default
mens rea for most crimes.321 Additionally, holding an actor
criminally responsible when actual awareness of the risk that a
person did not consent to sex, results in disproportionate
punishment for nonculpable conduct.322 As noted earlier, the
MPC drafts accept this criticism, advocating that criminal
liability for the crime of Sexual Penetration of a Vulnerable
Person is predicated on a mens rea of recklessness, rejecting the
application of the general rule for intoxication, which holds an
intoxicated defendant to a sober person’s negligence standard.323
Given the proposed statute’s emphasis on placing
criminal liability only when subjective culpability is established,
this article joins the MPC drafts’ call to abandon the general
rule that an intoxicated defendant would be judged against a
sober defendant’s standard, at least for the purpose of the
specific prohibition on nonconsensual sexual intercourse with
intoxicated victims.324
Rejecting the idea that criminal liability for the proposed
crime may be based on a mens rea of negligence is justified given
318 See People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 709 (N.Y. 1983), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 2006).
319 See generally Gideon Yaffe, Intoxication, Recklessness, and Negligence, 9 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 545, 549–50 (2012) (discussing the Intoxication Recklessness Principle).
320 See generally Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 254 (1998) (noting that the equation is often preposterous).
321 Id.; see also Yaffe, supra note 319, at 547 & n.3 (positing that the intoxication
recklessness principle authorizes the use of legal fiction because the actor is not actually
aware of the risks that he disregards).
322 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 597, 604, 609–10 (2001) (positing that substituting the harm the reckless
actor has foreseen for the actual harm that results punishes actors disproportionately to
their culpability).
323 See supra Section IV.B.
324 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.0,
at 32 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015) (stating that “‘[r]ecklessly’ shall
carry only the meaning designated in Model Penal Code Section 2.02(2)(c); the provisions
of Model Penal Code Section 2.08(2) shall not apply to” sexual offenses).
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the unique nature of the prohibition at issue. Since the crime of
sexual assault is different from all other crimes because the act—
sexual intercourse or oral sex—is in itself permissible, the
absence of consent is the key feature that distinguishes between
legal and prohibited conduct. The defendant’s subjective
awareness of the victim’s nonconsent becomes especially critical
given the ambiguity that often characterizes sexual encounters
and the possibility of misperception of the fact that the sexual act
is nonconsensual. The proposed statute therefore advocates the
suspension of the current MPC’s normal rule regarding
intoxicated defendants, requiring instead proof of the
defendant’s actual awareness of the risk that the victim’s
ability to communicate nonconsent was significantly impaired
due to intoxication.
To be clear, the broader implications of the current
MPC’s special recklessness rule with regard to intoxicated
defendants charged with nonsexual offenses raise complex
issues, exceeding the scope of this article. I leave for future
scholarship the idea of rejecting this rule altogether and the
question of its continued desirability as a general rule
applicable to other crimes. Instead, this article proposes only
that the MPC general rule would be suspended with respect to
the sexual assault of intoxicated victims statute.
Requiring the prosecution to prove subjective
recklessness would allow defendants to introduce evidence that
as a result of their own intoxication, they were unaware of the
risk that the victim’s ability to communicate nonconsent was
significantly impaired. Demanding proof of actual recklessness
is justified because it ensures that criminal sanctions are only
imposed on culpable defendants. Defendants act with a
blameworthy state of mind if they consciously ignore a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that consent is absent by
proceeding with the sexual act anyway.
Providing defendants with the opportunity to introduce
evidence of their own intoxication, however, would not necessarily
lead to absolving intoxicated defendants from criminal
responsibility. For example, in the Massachusetts case of
Commonwealth v. Mountry, a defendant convicted of raping an
intoxicated victim claimed on appeal that the trial court erred
in failing to instruct the jury that they may consider evidence
of his own mental incapacity due to intoxication.325 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the
defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed that they
325

Commonwealth v. Mountry, 972 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Mass. 2012).
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may consider evidence of his mental incapacity by intoxication
when deciding whether the government had met its burden of
proof as to his knowledge of the victim’s incapacity.326 Applying
this holding to the specific facts of the case, however, the court
concluded that the trial court made no prejudicial error
because there was no evidence of the defendant’s debilitating
intoxication; therefore, he was not entitled to an instruction on
his voluntary intoxication.327
Similarly, under the proposed statute, establishing some
level of the defendant’s own intoxication would not automatically
suffice to prove lack of actual awareness of the risk that a
material element of the offense exists. The prosecution might still
be able to show that the defendant’s intoxication was not
sufficiently severe to reach a degree that rendered him or her
unaware of the victim’s significant impairment in the ability to
communicate nonconsent. Only evidence of sufficiently
debilitating intoxication should satisfy the bar of proving the
defendant’s lack of subjective awareness.
The recent public outcry following the lenient sentence
imposed in the “Stanford rape case” on Brock Allen Turner
exemplifies another illustration of the law’s treatment of cases
involving both the victim and the defendant’s intoxication.328 On
January 18, 2015, two Stanford University graduate students
found Turner on top of an unconscious woman behind the
dumpster outside of a campus fraternity party.329 The twentythree-year-old victim was partially clothed and had a blood
alcohol level three times the legal limit.330 While the victim did
not remember anything about the incident, the two witnesses
said they saw Turner “thrusting” on top of her while she lied
motionless.331 Turner was arrested and later convicted by a jury
of three felony counts: assault with intent to commit rape of an
intoxicated woman, sexually penetrating an unconscious person
Id. at 448.
Id. at 449.
328 See Liam Stack, Light Sentence for Brock Turner in Stanford Rape Case
Draws Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/
outrage-in-stanford-rape-case-over-dueling-statements-of-victim-and-attackers-father.
html [https://perma.cc/42ZB-WBT9].
329 See People’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1–4, People v. Turner, No.
B1577162 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 27, 2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
2858504/Brock-Turner-Sentencing-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/P48T-BPPS]; see also Press
Release, Santa Clara Cty. Dist. Attorney Office, Former Stanford Student Sentenced to Six
Months in Jail for Sex Assault (June 2, 2016), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/da/news
room/newsreleases/Pages/NRA2016/Turner-Sentencing.aspx [https://perma.cc/2XXS-LS37].
330 People’s Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 329, at 4–5; see Stack,
supra note 328.
331 See People’s Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 329, at 6.
326
327
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with a foreign object, and sexually penetrating an intoxicated
person with a foreign object.332 While the conviction could have
resulted in a maximum penalty of fourteen years in prison, a
Santa Clara Superior Court judge sentenced Turner to six
months in county jail and probation.333
The outrage over the disproportionally light sentence
has diverted the public’s attention from a couple of critical facts,
mainly pertaining to the conviction itself and its implications.
First, the defendant was found guilty of three serious felonies
including sexual penetration with foreign objects of an
unconscious and intoxicated person, a conviction that carries a
host of collateral consequences including registering as a sex
offender for the rest of his life.334 Second, the defendant’s
intoxication has not provided him with a defense to the rape
charge. Instead, its role was limited to one mitigating factor in a
myriad of other factors used by the judge in the sentencing
phase. Presumably, the jury convicted Turner based on the
theory that despite being intoxicated to a certain extent, his
intoxication did not rise to a degree that precluded subjective
awareness of the victim’s unconsciousness, and that he had
known, or reasonably should have known, of the victim’s being
prevented from resisting due to her severe intoxication.335
To be clear, the critique concerning Turner’s sentence is
justified given the utterly disproportionate relationship between
the severity of the crime and the lenient punishment. The
problem with the sentence lies with striking an inappropriate
balance between mitigating and aggravating circumstances by
assigning excessive weight to the defendant’s intoxication,
privileging it over all other relevant circumstances, including
the ample harm inflicted on the victim.
The proposed statute, however, espouses the distinction
embedded in Turner’s conviction between the role of the
332 CAL. PENAL CODE § 220 (a)(1) (West 2010) (prohibiting assault with intent
to commit rape); id. § 289(d) (prohibiting sexual penetration with a foreign object of an
unconscious person); id. § 289(e) (prohibiting sexual penetration with a foreign object of
a person who was prevented from resisting by intoxicating substance when the actor
knew or should have known of the complainant’s situation); see also Sentencing Memo,
supra note 328, at 14.
333 See Sentencing Memo, supra note 329, at 25 (prosecutor noting that the
defendant’s maximum penalty is fourteen years in prison).
334 Id. at 2.
335 Id. at 25 (noting that the defendant “testified that he was not so drunk that
he did not know what he was doing”). It should be noted that the mens rea required for
conviction of the above offenses is knowledge or alternatively, “should have known,” CAL.
PENAL CODE § 289(e) (West 2013) (prohibiting “[a]ny person who commits an act of sexual
penetration when the victim is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic
substance, or any controlled substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably
should have been known by the accused”).
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defendant’s intoxication in imposing criminal liability and its role
as a mitigating factor during sentencing. For the purpose of
imposing criminal liability, requiring proof of the defendant’s
actual awareness will not necessarily result in acquitting an
intoxicated defendant for sexually assaulting an intoxicated
victim when the defendant’s intoxication does not reach a
sufficiently debilitating level. Put differently, proof that the
defendant was intoxicated does not preclude conviction because
an intoxicated defendant may still form intent and mere
intoxication does not automatically negate awareness of the
victim’s condition. The defendant might be heavily intoxicated,
yet his or her impairment would not be sufficient to render him or
her unaware of the risk that the victim does not consent to sexual
intercourse. Yet, the defendant’s intoxication might be taken into
account when considering a host of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances at the sentencing phase.
3. Factors Whose Presence Might Support a Finding of
Culpability
To accomplish the goal of prohibiting only culpable
conduct, the proposal identifies a couple of factors supporting a
finding that a defendant is a sexual predator who recklessly
took advantage of a victim’s significant impairment in the ability
to communicate nonconsent to sexual penetration. Grounding
criminal liability in the defendant’s exploitative behavior is
critical to identifying the cases that should be criminally
prosecuted, distinguishing them from those involving permissible
intoxicated sexual encounters. While these factors are by no
means conclusive, their presence strongly suggests that an actor
is criminally culpable.
a. Preparatory Actions That Facilitate the Sexual Assault
One circumstance that is typically present in cases
involving sexual assault of intoxicated victims is when
perpetrators engage in preparatory actions that facilitate the
sexual assault. These acts of preliminary planning make the
perpetration of the sexual assault easier by gaining control and
trust over victims. For example, these steps often include
purportedly offering to help impaired victims, taking charge of
escorting or driving victims home, ostensibly worrying for their
safety, or luring victims to secluded areas by suggesting that
they lay down in another room after noticing symptoms of
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impairing intoxication, or otherwise taking actions to isolate
victims from others who might help them avoid harm.336
An example of such facilitation is illustrated in Kansas
v. Smith in which the defendant, after noticing that the victim
passed out in his car, indicated that it was not safe for her to
drive and offered his bedroom, promising to sleep on the couch,
but later took advantage of her intoxicated condition to impose
a nonconsensual sexual act.337 In circumstances such as these,
defendants deliberately take preliminary steps to further the
sexual assault by preventing intoxicated victims from calling
out for help.
b. Victim’s Visible Signs of Intoxication
The proposed statute requires proof that the defendant
was subjectively aware of the victim’s significant mental and
physical impairment. Of course, a defendant is not expected to
have the medical knowledge that would enable him or her to
assess the precise level of a victim’s intoxication. Severely
impairing intoxication is clearly visible, however, and any
layperson can easily identify its common symptoms. Such
observable symptoms include vomiting, incontinence, slurred
speech, unsteady gait, combative behavior, and the inability to
know and understand what is happening.338 A conviction would
be possible if the prosecution is able to prove that the
defendant’s own intoxication did not preclude such awareness,
and that he or she was at least reckless with respect to the
victim’s significant impairment in the ability to communicate
nonconsent yet consciously disregarded the substantial and
unjustifiable risk that consent was lacking. Proof of the
defendant’s awareness of the victim’s symptoms may be further
336 See generally Commonwealth v. Blache, 880 N.E.2d 736, 739, 745–46 (Mass.
2008) (A case where a police officer who was summoned to help with a belligerent victim,
who had exhibited visible signs of extreme intoxication, volunteered to give her a ride
home and then allegedly sexually assaulted her in the police cruiser. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a jury instruction concerning a complainant’s
capacity to consent to intercourse should be given if the evidence presented at trial
demonstrates that the complainant was so impaired due to excessive consumption of
alcohol that she was incapable of consenting. The court further held that the prosecution
must prove that defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the complainant’s
condition rendered her incapable of consenting. The court remanded for a new trial
because the trial court’s instructions to the jury failed to explain fully or with sufficient
clarity the above legal standards.).
337 State v. Smith, 178 P.3d 672, 676 (Kan. 2008).
338 Just to clarify, the proposal would only allow conviction of defendants who
were consciously aware of the victim’s significant impairment given visible signs. When
the defendant is also significantly intoxicated, there may be situations in which his or
her impairment is sufficiently severe to render him or her unaware of these symptoms.
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supported if other witnesses who also observed these symptoms
testify about the circumstances, indicating that the defendant
had to be aware of them too.339
C.

The Proposed Statute’s Advantages

The proposed statute offers several advantages compared
both to existing prohibitions on sexual assault of intoxicated
victims and the ALI’s proposals discussed earlier.340 First, it
replaces the problematic ITCS with a test that focuses on
victims’ significant impairment in the ability to communicate
nonconsent due to intoxication.341 This alternative test for
drawing the line between criminal and legal intoxicated sex
shifts the focus away from evaluating the victim’s incapacity to
exercise judgment and toward impairment in communication
abilities. As previously discussed, the notion of exercising
judgment is subjective and ambiguous.342 In contrast,
impairment in communication abilities is a much more objective
standard since it is observable and thus more easily determined
by a defendant. Importantly, the proposed standard makes
nonconsensual sex, rather than the victim’s physical and mental
capabilities to exercise judgment, the cornerstone of the crime.
Second, the proposed standard acknowledges that
diminished ability to express nonconsent to sex due to
intoxication extends beyond situations where the victim was
completely unconscious or nearing such condition. By relocating
the line between permissible and prohibited sexual intercourse
from complete incapacity toward significant impairment, the
statute provides the necessary protection against sexual
violation for victims whose intoxication was sufficiently severe to
significantly impair their ability to communicate refusal to sex,
including cases falling short of loss of consciousness.
339 Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 739, 746–47 (An example of a case in which the
defendant was clearly aware of the victim’s symptoms of intoxication, yet consciously
took advantage of her vulnerable condition. The defendant was an on duty police officer
who was summoned by the victim’s acquaintances for what they described as
“need[ing] assistance with an unwanted and very intoxicated female guest.” The
defendant personally witnessed the victim’s signs of impairing intoxication, including
belligerent behavior, slurred speech, urinating on the street, and driving her truck into
a fence and a house. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the state
should not only prove that as a result of alcohol and drugs the victim’s physical or
mental condition was so impaired that she could not consent to sex, but also that the
defendant knew or should have known of the victim’s incapacitation.).
340 See supra Section IV.C (discussing the drawbacks in the Model Penal
Code’s various drafts).
341 See supra Section III.B (elaborating on the difficulties stemming from the
incapacity-to-consent standard).
342 See supra Section III.B.1.
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Third, the proposed statute’s mens rea requirement of
subjective awareness of the victim’s lack of consent ensures that
criminal liability is imposed only on morally culpable actors. The
recklessness requirement distinguishes dangerous sexual
predators who consciously take advantage of intoxicated victims’
vulnerability from merely negligent actors whose behavior falls
short of criminal culpability. Aiming to catch only sexual
predators within its net, the proposed statute implies that actors
who engaged in sexual misconduct but were not subjectively
aware that the victim’s ability to communicate nonconsent was
significantly impaired, might be subject to civil or administrative
liability, but not to criminal sanctions.343
Finally, the proposed statute rejects criminal liability in
cases where intoxicated people have expressed consent to sexual
acts but their level of intoxication casts doubts on whether their
consent was genuine. As mentioned earlier, the Giardino court’s
holding may result in imposing criminal liability even if
affirmative consent had been given on the theory that the
intoxicated person was unable to make a reasonable judgment or
would have refrained from the sexual act had he or she not been
intoxicated.344 In contrast, the proposed statute is premised on
the idea that the law should refrain from prohibiting individuals
from engaging in intoxicated yet fully consensual sex. Sexual
autonomy requires that the law recognize individuals’ right to
express consent to sex when they are intoxicated, even if they
would not have consented had they been sober.345 Even assuming
that it was the state of intoxication that contributed to the
choice to have sex, being intoxicated does not negate an
individual’s right to consent per se. A legal standard that
prevents an intoxicated individual from consenting to sex is
343 Under tort law, a negligent actor might be liable for inflicting harm on a
victim of sexual misconduct. Also, Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sex, requires higher education institutions receiving
federal funds to adopt policies and procedures to investigate and adjudicate sexual
misconduct allegations. An actor might be liable for violating these policies. See Sarah
L. Swan, Between Title IX and the Criminal Law: Bringing Tort Law to the Campus
Sexual Assault Debate, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 963, 970–72 (2016) (positing that tort law
may provide an additional source of redress to victims of campus sexual assault);
Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform,
125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1971–78 (2016) (describing the endeavors of the Office for Civil
Rights at the Department of Education to enforce the prohibition against discrimination
based on sex in higher education institutions).
344 See People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 321–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(reversing the conviction for improper jury instruction but remanding the case and
holding that under the incapacity-to-consent standard, a conviction might be possible if
the jury found that the victim was unable to make a reasonable judgment or would have
refrained had she not been intoxicated); see supra Section III.B.1.d.
345 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 296, at 232–33, 237, 251–52.
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overly paternalistic and cannot be justified in a legal regime that
makes consent the essence of permissible sexual encounters.
The proposed statute responds to potential criticism and
objections to expanding criminal liability to cover sexual
assault of voluntarily intoxicated victims. One objection is that
such expansion would contribute to the overcriminalization
phenomenon, which is a general problem in the criminal justice
system, carrying ample collateral consequences for convicted
defendants and disproportionally affecting racial and ethnic
minorities.346 Relatedly, scholars might express concerns that
revising sexual assault statutes would further contribute to the
problems of severe punishment policies and overincarceration.347
Professor Aya Gruber, for example, suggested that the problem
of sexual assaults may also be addressed through alternative
noncriminal methods and that revising criminal laws is not
necessarily beneficial to promote gender equality.348 Second,
critics might also argue that the proposal is unjust to defendants
because when both the victim and the alleged perpetrator
voluntarily imbibe, it is unfair to place the risk of harsh criminal
sanctions only on one party.349 Proper risk allocation demands
that both parties bear the responsibility for voluntarily rendering
themselves impaired.
Regarding overcriminalization concerns, I have written
elsewhere about other aspects of the overcriminalization
phenomenon and I concede that in some areas, too many
criminal statutes and heavy enforcement create significant
problems.350 In the specific area of sexual assault of intoxicated
victims, however, an opposite problem of undercriminalization
and underenforcement exists, rather than overcriminalization

346 See generally Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 703, 716–18 (2005) (discussing various aspects of the overcriminalization problem
and elaborating on its ample consequences including, among others, unlimited law
enforcement discretion, disproportionate effects on racial minorities, and waste of
resources).
347 See, e.g., Carol Steiker, Introduction to Symposium, Mass Incarceration:
Causes, Consequences, and Exit Strategies, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 1 (2011) (noting that
the “American rate of incarceration has increased more than fivefold since 1972” and that
the “current rate is more than 700 per 100,000”); see also Capers, supra note 10, at 1294–
95 (noting that “black men are disproportionately represented in prisons,” but there is no
discussion about the “sexual punishments collaterally inflicted on black men”).
348 See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV.
581, 657–58 (2009) (noting that while date rape should not be decriminalized, reformers
should investigate noncriminal methods to address this problem).
349 See Taranto, supra note 293 (arguing that both parties should be equally
responsible for intoxicated sex).
350 See generally Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2015) (discussing the problem of overcriminalization).
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and overenforcement.351 Conceding that the criminal law is a
stringent weapon and that its use should be extremely cautious
and strictly limited to egregious cases of sexual imposition, the
proposed statute attempts to find a middle ground between
imposing overbroad criminal liability and underinclusive
sexual assault statutes. As Professor Schulhofer aptly
observed, “sexual [assault] policy is neither a cause of the
problem [of overincarceration] nor a means to alleviate it,”
given the fact that the problem is mostly attributable to drug
enforcement policies.352
Regarding unfairness to defendants concerns, this
article acknowledges that given the ambiguities that often
surround intoxicated sexual encounters, this risk is not
insubstantial. However, the proposed statute attempts to reduce
this risk by ensuring that the legal boundary between criminal
and noncriminal conduct is more properly drawn. Under the
proposal, consciously taking advantage of a voluntarily
intoxicated individual to impose nonconsensual sex warrants
criminal sanction, while engaging in sexual acts with an
intoxicated individual under circumstances falling short of
exploitation of vulnerability remains beyond the realm of the
criminal law. The offense’s elements are sufficiently narrow to
encompass only circumstances indicating taking advantage of
the victim’s significant impairment in the ability to express
nonconsent. The statute offers an equitable resolution by
ensuring that several requirements are met prior to labeling
drunken sex a sex crime, thus alleviating the risk of unfairness
to defendants.
D.

Application of the Proposed Statute

In the case discussed in the Introduction, the
defendant’s having oral sex with a victim who was coming in
and out of consciousness throughout the sexual encounter
constituted no crime under existing law.353 Revisiting this case
offers an opportunity to test the operation of the proposal in
order to predict whether the case might have come out
differently had the proposed statute been applied.354

351 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C.
L. REV. 1287, 1289–91, 1294 (2016) (noting that rape law is largely underenforced, with
police often failing to properly investigate rape complaints).
352 See Schulhofer, supra note 250, at 677–78.
353 See supra Introduction.
354 See supra Introduction.
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In contrast to existing Oklahoma law, the proposed
statute covers nonconsensual oral, vaginal, and anal intercourse
perpetrated against intoxicated victims, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily intoxicated. The prosecution will likely be able to
prove the actus reus of the offense, namely, that the sexual act
was nonconsensual because the victim’s ability to communicate
nonconsent was significantly impaired due to extreme
intoxication. Since the victim passed out at various points
throughout the sexual encounter, the jury will likely find that her
ability to effectively communicate unwillingness was significantly
impaired given her severely intoxicated condition. Importantly,
the proposed statute would cover situations such as this, in
which the victim was consciousness during some portions of the
sexual act (otherwise she would not have been able to perform
oral sex on the defendant).
The prosecution would also likely be able to establish
the defendant’s mens rea of recklessness. There was evidence
to prove that the victim exhibited visible signs of debilitating
intoxication, including inability to walk and coming in and out
of consciousness as well as evidence that the defendant had
personally seen such easily observable symptoms, including her
inability to stand straight, her being carried to his car by
others, and her passing out inside his car.355 Given these visible
symptoms, the defendant must have been subjectively aware
that the victim’s ability to oppose the sexual act was
significantly impaired. While the defendant was also intoxicated,
there was no evidence to suggest that his impairment was
debilitating enough to reach a level that precluded his subjective
awareness of the risk that the victim was significantly impaired
to the extent that precluded her from communicating nonconsent.
The defendant’s conduct preceding the sexual assault could
further support the finding that he consciously took steps to
facilitate it by taking a victim who was unable to walk into his
car, exercising complete control over her and isolating her from
other people in the public space who might have helped her.
In sum, in contrast to the outcome under existing
Oklahoma law, the defendant would probably have been found
guilty under the proposed statute had it been applied. Imposing
criminal liability on the defendant, in this case, is normatively
justified given the underlying circumstances demonstrating his
culpability in consciously taking advantage of a victim’s
significantly impaired condition to impose nonconsensual sex.

355

See Redden, supra note 1.
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CONCLUSION
The criminal regulation of nonconsensual sexual acts
perpetrated against voluntarily intoxicated individuals raises
not only difficult doctrinal questions but also contentious
normative and policy-based considerations. One area of debate
in criminal law in general, and in rape law in particular,
concerns the proper relationship between legal and social
change. Should changes in social norms and sexual mores
precede legal changes, with the law reflecting prevailing social
perceptions rather than imposing them on society through the
use of the coercive criminal justice system, or alternatively,
should the law actively foster changes in existing societal
norms where their injurious consequences suggest that
immediate change is much needed to prevent future harm?
This article favors the latter position, arguing that the
criminal law should be used here as an educational vehicle with
the goal of a continued effort to promote changes in prevailing
societal perceptions as many societal attitudes about
nonconsensual sex have already shifted and will continue to do
so.356 Criminal law’s expressive function is especially critical in
prosecutions of sexual assaults because it sends a clear message
to potential perpetrators that intercourse with extremely
intoxicated individuals whose ability to communicate
nonconsent is significantly impaired is criminally prohibited.
The article acknowledges the tradeoffs embedded in this
position: protecting voluntarily intoxicated victims by adopting
criminal statutes that might precede changes in societal
perceptions, which are currently still in a state of flux, might
result in potentially harsh consequences for some defendants.
There are, however, various mechanisms in place to ameliorate
this risk by ensuring that sanctions are imposed only on
culpable defendants and in proportion to their level of
culpability. Sexual assault statutes may adopt a grading
structure that distinguishes between different defendants
based on their respective degree of culpability; the offense of
sexually assaulting involuntarily intoxicated victim should be
graded higher than the offense of sexually assaulting a
voluntarily intoxicated individual. Moreover, sexually
assaulting an involuntarily intoxicated victim may serve as a
sentence enhancement because surreptitiously administering
356 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 6–7 (noting that many shifts in societal
perceptions are already taking place including the acknowledgement that passivity
does not signify consent to intercourse).
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intoxicants is an aggravating circumstance. But sexual assault
statutes should not make criminal liability itself dependent on
whether the victim’s intoxication was voluntary or involuntary.

